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ABSTRACT
A theory of educating is always derived from philosophical tenets.
In Western society these tenets are concerned primarily with the provision,
maintenance and evolution of knowledge for use by future generations.
The provision of knowledge for future generations is for the purpose of
ensuring cultural and biological survival. Essentially this provision
involves two major criteria: first, that only that knowledge which has been
judged to be exce11 ent shou1d be passed on and, second, in add it ion to
providing knowledge claims, the evidence for knowledge claims must also be
extended in order to fully enrich meaning for an individual involved in a
learning experience. Embedded in such a theory of educating are a concept
of educational excellence and a concept of the provision of evidence for
knowledge claims.
This thesis applied the contributions of metaphilosophy to the concepts
of educational excellence and the provision of evidence. The metaphilosophy
of Stephen C. Pepper was examined for its contributions to a theory of
educating and a concept of educational excellence.
Metaphilosophy is concerned with making knowledge meaningful. It is
a subject matter which may be studied in and of itself and it is a method
for acquiring meaning by interpreting knowledge. Historically people have
interpreted the knowledge of the world from basically four adequate world
views which Pepper termed formism, mechanism, contextual ism and organicism.
He later proposed a fifth world view which he termed selectivism. In
this thesis these world views were shown to contribute in a variety of ways
to educational excellence, most particularly as they allow for interpretations
(iii)
and analysis of evidence about knowledge claims.
Selecti vismwas examined in depth and was shown to contribute to
educational excellence in two major ways; first, as a world hypothesis
which offers an interpretation of the evidence for knowledge claims and,
second, as a metahypothesis which provides knowledge about the nature of
knowledge.
Finally the importance of metaphilosophy in contributing to cultural
survival was demonstrated in a discussion of the potential impact of
selectivism on a theory of educating and educational excellence.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Knowledge, then, is the indispensable condition of expansion
of mind, and the instrument of attaining to it ••• but a
truly great intellect ••• possesses the knowledge, not only
of things, but also of their mutual and true relations;
knowledge n?t merely considered as acquirement, but as
philosophy.
Cardinal John Henry Newman
Knowledge may be thought of as the alterable, accumulative and social
construction of reality, acquired by experiencing events in the world.
Persons, facts and objects are all events to be experienced. They are
considered events in the world because they are constantly changing and
their existence is finite. Dynamically events come in arrdout of the
world. Knowledge constructions are events which may be experienced and
speculated upon.
When an individual experiences events in the world, he or she constructs
knowledge claims about what he or she believes are the realities being
perceived. Knowledge is always knowledge from a certain perspective.
Much human behaviour is directed towards validati~g~percept1ons of
life1s events and creating meaning from experiences of events. Knowledge
must be meaningful to be of value to an individual.
Meaningful knowledge assists an individual to adapt and relate to his
or her environment. For human beings, existence is purposeless unless
there is a continual and meaningful exchange between individuals and the
world they live in. Life without meaning has no purpose. Knowledge claims
are constructed to provide meaning for oneself and for others. When
meanings and perceptions are shared, knowledge becomes a social construction.
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Meaning may be acquired on many different levels of complexity.
A child may acquire meaning through the completion of the assembling of
a puzzle; just as a philosopher may acquire meaning in understanding what
constitutes truth, beauty or justice. Individuals seek both intellectual
and emotional meaning from knowledge claims. 80th the intellectual and
emotional dimensions of meaning are required to give purpose to human
existence. Knowledge is meaningful when it evokes thinking and feeling.
In making knowledge meaningful, a person sometimes uses the methods
of philosophy. To philosophize is to engage in meaning making. Every
personls philosophy represents his or her means of comprehending the world,
by joining together intelligibly the facts he or she perceives. In the
joining together of perceived facts and data, individuals create symbolic
sChema called hypotheses, which organize data into meaningful concepts he
or she uses to perceive and comprehend the world. Philosophies or world
views are also events in the world which a person may speculate upon.
To inquire about and reflect on world views is to engage in metaphilosophy.
Metaphilosophy is a method for speculating on world views to further
enrich meaning. However, metaphilosophy is also an event in the world and·
consequently is best regarded as both a subject matter and a method for
acquiring meaning.
Acquiring meaning may be a social as well as an individual process.
Education is an example of a social process for the extension of meaning
to others. Educating is the enrichment of another personls experiences
by giving those experiences new or additional meaning. Seeking to enrich
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or give meaning to human knowledge of experience is the purpose of
educatiGJoal.· ,excellence.
Education is excellent if it provides an opportunity for people to
share perceptions and meanings which evoke thinking and feeling. In
Western society, such meanings are found in those materials and ideas which
have been judged and found to be excellent because they provide (I) a
version of knowledge and truth, (2) criteria of beauty, elegance, and/or
artistic merit, (3) criterion of human judgement, like justice in politics
or fairness in ethics, and (4) criteria about what is valuable in life. 2
The idea. of excellence is central to education because education is
regarded as a vehicle for cultural continuity. That which is excellent
must be conserved and progressively extended from one generation to another.
In providing a vehicle for cultural continuity, educative materials must
possess an appropri ate cri teriOR of exce II ence wh ich allows for the
intellectual and emotional sharing of meaning.
It is the intent of this thesis to first, explicate the conceptual
relationship between meaning, knowledge, metaphilosophy and educating,
and second, to demonstrate that metaphilosophy has an important contribution
to make to the pursuit of educational excellence.
This author feels intuitively that an individual is concerned both
with acquiring meaningful knowledge from the events he or she experiences
in life and also applying meaningful knowledge to the events he or she
experiences. Individuals interacting with their environment do so by
reorganizing old meanings in terms of new meanings. In other:words, people
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actively and purposefully engage in learning when they interact with the
world around them.
Educators can assist an individual to learn, to enrich and expand
the meaning of the knowledge that he or she acquires about events in the
world. Educators can also expose an individual to additional knowledge
events in the world and thus provide an opportunity for acquiring further
meaning in life. It is also felt that to assist educators in their
endeavours, particularly in the provision of meaningful knowledge claims
which possess educational excellence, metaphilosophy can provide an
epistemology for the task. Metaphilosophy can provide educators with
knowledge about knowledge.
METAPHILOSOPHY
In the area of metaphilosophy this thesis will concentrate on the
thoughts of Stephen C. Pepper (1891-1972). Described as the1llast of the
Renaissance men'l who made all knowledge his province, and taught his readers
to see their world with the same vast scope, he is regarded by some
scholars (Monast, Efron, and Duncan) as one of the great philosophers of
the 20th century.3 Most of his career was spent as a professor of Philosophy
and Aesthetics at the University of California in Berkeley. He was the
author of articles and books on I·psychology, art, aesthetics, logic, ethics,
genera 1 va 1ue theory and metaphys ics ••.4
Pepper1s work in metaphilosophy is important as a comprehensive
analysis and .. explication of most of the world views or theories which have
existed in the history of human thought. He developed the term world
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Hypotheses to encompass the various world theories that philosophers have
held through the ages.
In his analysis of world theories, Pepper was concerned with the
"study of evidence and hypothesis ~ toward a reliable method rather than
a reliable creed. u5 He created a methodology for considering world theories
to be hypotheses because he felt that none of the world theories he had
identified could support a claim to absolute truth or certainty. He
regarded world hypotheses as hypothetical, as symbolic structures for
creating meaning out of the facts of the world. Pepper believed that a
totally adequate world hypothests"has yet to appear in human thought. By
adequacy, he meant a Uhypothesis of unlimited scope and precision. 1I He
has, however, outlined four relatively adequate world hypotheses which he
terms formism, mechanism, contextual ism and organicism. These will each
be discussed in chapter II in relation to the concepts of meaning, knowledge
and educating~ Briefly, they are hypotheses whic~ in attempting to organize
the total evidence in the world, provide IIfour different approximations
to the nature of the world. lI ?
Later in his career, Pepper began to articulate what he called a
fifth relatively adequate world hypothesis which he termed ~electivism.
It is this area of PepperJs metaphilosophy which will be examined most
thoroughly in this thesis, to see how -selectivism relates conceptually
to educating and educational excellence. In the area of educating, the
work of D. Bob Gowln will provide a theoretical foundation for the purpose
of this thesis.
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EDUCATING
Gowin, in his book Educating, conceptualizes education as an eventful
process very definitely grounded in a central notion of meaning. For
Gowin, lito teach is to extend meaning. IIB Teaching is to share meaning
in an educational context. Gowin perceives four common elements in the
educative process which he identifies as the teacher, curriculum, student
and the governing social order. 9 These elements will be considered in
trying to discover the relationships that exist between metaphilosophy,
particularly selectivism, educating and educational excellence.
Gowin1s theory of educating is relevant to this thesis in several ways.
First, his analysis of the concept of educating is related by definition
to the concept of meaning. Second, he shares with P@pper a belief that a
theory of educating should be based on the reflective co-operation of
philosophy, common sense and science. lllO It is with this belief in mind
that both Pepper and Gowin created sense structuring devices for enriching
meaning, one in the area of metaphilosophy and the other in the context of
educating. Third, Gowin offers an explication of educational excellence
as it relates to (I) shared meaning between teacher and student and (2) the
criteria of excellence in educative materials. His concepts of educating
and educational excellence provide part of the theoretical groundwork of
this thesis.
Gowin has developed a very useful method for visually presenting
relationships between concepts, which he terms IIconcept mapping. lI11 A
concept map is a visual display and description of the interrelationships
of concepts, exploiting the metaphor of the map~ The technique used in
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constructing a concept map begins by listing all of the concepts involved
and then rank ordering the concepts by order of importance beginning at
the top of the page. Lines of relation between the concepts are then
drawn and labelled. At the end of each.chapter sunlmary inthis thesis,
a concept map is used to assist the reader in comprehending the relationships
between concepts that were discussed. Such relationships may be thought
of as constructs or bridges across one conceptual field to another. Figure
I is a concept map of Chapter I. In the next few paragraphs a brief overview
is gi ven of the chapters to follow.
LOOKING AHEAD
Chapter II explicates Pepper1s notion of world hypotheses and shows how
formism, mechanism, contextual ism and organicism possess implications for
educating and educational excellence.
Chapter III is a detailed outline of selectivism. It was Pepper1s
intent that selectivism eventually be thought of as a fifth world hypothesis.
It should be noted that some of the scholars who have studied Pepper feel
that in fact selectivism is not a fifth world hypothesis, but is merely a
deeper contextual ism. Others feel that it is a synthesis of the original
four world hypotheses. These and other criticisms regarding the identity
of selectivism are dealt with briefly in Chapter IV.
Chapter IV also critiques the strengths and weaknesses of selectivism
and suggests a conceptual relationship between Pepper1s selectivism and the
systems philosophy of Ervin Laszlo which was developed in 1972.
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Chapter V articulates how selectivism contributes to a theory of
educating by providing a basis for educational excellence.
Chapter VI summarizes the relationships trtd.~ing the concepts of
metaphilosophy, primarily selectivism, educating and educational excellence
discovered in this inquiry. Additionally the implications of these
relationships for cultural continuity and the survival of society are
discussed. Concepts arising out of this thesis which require further
analysis and inquiry are also noted.
SUMMARY
Chapter I has been an attempt to introduce the reader to the key
concepts of metaphilosophy and educating and to show that by definition
they are related to the central notion of meaning as it applies to
knowledge. It is the contention of this thesis that there are a number
of relationships which exist between the concepts of meaning, knowledge,
metaphilosophy and educating. It is anticipated that these relationships
can be demonstrated in a conceptual framework which will act as a guide
for educators, to enrich their understanding of metaphilosophy, particularly
selectivism as a basis for educational excellence. This chapter has also
served to introduce the reader to Stephen Pepper and Bob Gowin whose
respective contributions to an understanding of metaphilosophyand educating
provide the theoretical groundwork for this thesis. It is anticipated
that the final conc~ptual framewo'rk that is developed will offer a
synthesis of metaphilosophy, most particularly selectivism as it relates to
educating and educational excellence. In addition, this conceptual
framework should arouse invitations for further inquiry.
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It is also this author1s wish that if a theory of educating and
educational excellence can be demonstrated to be enriched by metaphilosophy,
then some of the current perceptions about the validity and usefulness
of the methods of metaphilosophy and philosophy in general will change
No longer will metaphilosophy be perceived as a vague and inhibiting realm
of knowledge, comprehensible only to philosophers and engaged in as mere
intellectual aerohits; but rather metaphilosophy may attain the status of
an event which has a concrete and practical application to other events
in the world.
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CHAPTER II
WORLD HYPOTHESES AND EDUCATING
INTRODUCTION
The attainment of enriched meaning involves individuals in the process
of validating and valuing their own and others perceptions and constructions
of knowledge about the world. Validating a knowledge construction or
claim to give it additional meaning and value requires the provision of
evidence. For example, an examination of the painting entitled liThe
Cornfield ll by John Constable (1776-1837) will enrich the meaning of an
artistic experience for an individual only if he or she is presented with
evidence corroborating his or her perception that the painting truly possesses
aesthetic value and artistic merit.
World hypotheses contribute to the attainment and enrichment of meaning~
essentially because they are methods concerned with providing evidence about
the nature of the world. Education is also concerned with the provision of
evidence. This is exemplified in the act of teaching which may be
conceptualized as an activity which provides students with knowledge claims,
and in addition, presents reasons and evidence in support of these knowledge
claims. It is the intent of this author to demonstrate in this chapter
that world hypotheses contribute to education by providing a variety of
different methods for attaining evidence about the nature and excellence of
knowledge claims. This endeavour is based on the premise that in order to
enrich and extend the meaning of another1s experience~ education must do more
than assist individuals to acquire knowledge claims~ Education is not only
for the purpose of acquiring a great deal of knowledge on a great many
subjects, but is also for the purpose of explaining and providing evidence
for the nature and excellence or lack of excellence regarding knowledge claims.
-13-
The question which arises however is, what is it that counts as
evidence? Assume the knowledge claim that liThe Cornfield ll is an aesthetic
piece of art. What is the evidence for this? Pepper defines evidence
as that which can be corroborated. He states:
Grounds for belief are ••• always in terms of weight of evidence,
which means in terms ~f the amount of corroboration of evidence
that can be achieved.
liThe Cornfield ll is then anaesthetic piece of art to the degree that there
is a certain amount of corroboration of such a knowledge claim.
ON THE NATURE OF ·THE CORROBORATION OF EVIDENCE
There are two types of corroboration of evidence which Pepper
distinguishes. The first is Umultiplicative corroboration ll in which an
observation of a particular fact is taken repeatedly bya number of
different observers. 2 If there is essential agreement between these
observers as to the nature of the fact observed, then that fact is said
to be corroborated. For example, consider a group of indivi~uals in a room
examining a glass on a table top~ These individuals exhibit multiplicative
corroboration if in confirming the evidence of the existence of the glass
they agree to mutual perceptions such as (1) the object is clear in colour,
(2) is shaped like a glass, (3) has liquid in it, (4) is 4 inches high, etc.
Multiplicative corroboration is a number of observations of one identical
fact.
The second type of corroboration is termed Ustructural corroboration ll
and is a corroboration of fact with fact. 3 Many different facts may be
observed to converge to a given fact. Corroborating facts are held together
-14-
structurally by a hy~othesis and when the hypothesis is verified the
system of facts or evidence becomes more believable and provides meaning
to individuals. For example, consider an individual who perceives the
world to be a vast integrated machine. Such a hypothesis represents this
individual1s world view, his or her presupposed view of reality within
which he or she makes sense out of the world. To the extent that this or
any other individual can find facts in the world that corroborate this
world hypothesis, the hypothesis is given additional credence and worth;
meaning is enriched for those who experience the world in this way.
It is in the context of the structural corroboration of evidence that
Pepper devised his metaphilosophy of world hypotheses. He was concerned
with the problem of what it means to provide evidence on a broad scale
using structural corroboration and felt it was necessary to use hypothesis
of very broad scope, or world hypotheses~ Each world hypotheses gives a
different interpretation as to the nature of the world and each arises
from a different origin. Pepper developed the Hroot metaphor theory" to
expl~in the origins of world hypotheses. In speculating on the origins of
world hypotheses Pepper is seeking to enrich his knowledge about certain
existing knowledge claims. He is constructing a knowledge claim called the
root metaphor theory which incorporates those claims called world hypotheses.
He is engaging in the methods of metaphilosophy.
THE ROOT METAPHOR THEORY
Recall from the introduction to this thesis that the creation of
meaning involves an individual in the task of hypothesizing, of symbolically
arranging perceived data to help him or- her make sense of th-e world.
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Embarking on this process, a person tends to search for some clues, some
common sense fact to assist his or fl,@":r' 'comp.reh~@nsj orL·.', '~lhe ~~@nd'ency' 'j',s to
grasp onto this common sense fact and try to understand all other areas
of the world in terms of it. The original common sense fact becomes the
basic analogy by which an individual interprets other facts in the
world. Pepper has termed these analogies II root metaphors. IA
The four root metaphors that develop into world hypotheses are
formism, mechanism, contextual ism and organicism. The root metaphor of
formism is similarity, mechanism - the machine, contextual ism - an event
in its· context, and organicism - an integrative whole.5
It has been stated that world hypotheses contribute to the attainment
and enrichment of meaning, essentially because they are methods concerned
with providing evidence about the nature of the world. What is it however
that constitutes formistic, mechanistic, contextualistic and organistic
evidence? Refer back to the previous example of a glass situated on a
tabletop. The evidence for the truth of its existence or for the truth of
its aesthetic value would be perceived according to the root metaphors ·of
Pepper1s four world hypotheses as follows: 6
World Hypothests Perception and Provision of Evidence
FORMISM - The glass is a member of a category of all objects
made of glass, all clear coloured objects, all
objects used for drinking, etc. To the degree that
the perceived glass is similar to these categories
then it is a glass. It is aesthetically good if it
matches the ideal form of these categories.
MECHANISM
CONTEXTUALISM
ORGANICISM
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- The glass is percei ved as' having shape, weight,
and solid.ity and is acted upon by gravity. The
glass in turn acts to cause an effect on the
"percei ving indi vidual,. If the glass causes a
pleasurable effect then it is aesthetically valuable.
- Contextual ism recognizes everything that mechanism
does, but concentrates on the immediate context of
the glass in its particular situation. i.e. sitting
on the table top with liquid in it. If the situation
altered in any way, the uniqueness and reality of
the glass would change. i.e. if it were empty or
lying on its side on the table top.
- The organicist believes like the contextualist that
the environment surrounding the glass determines its
nature, but would stress the interconnectedness of
the variables making u"p the envi ronment. i.e. the
glass is not merely the total of what one perceives,
but is the totality of the craftsmanship and natural
products that created it and have determined its
present condition and will determine its future
condition.
D. A. Roberts, summarily descrtbes each of Pepper IS four adequate world
hypotheses as follows:?
FORMISM
MECHANISM
- What form do things take?
- How do different things caus~" link with,
influence, or correlate, with other things?
CONTEXTUALISM- What is this event all about, given the context?
ORGANICISM - How do objects, events, fit into a totality?
Each of the four world hypotheses provides via their root metaphor a
method for interpreting evidence about the nature of events in the world.
This raises a number of questions. What evidence can world hypotheses
provide about the nature and excellence of educative events? From the
perspective of these world hypotheses, what knowledge claims can be
constructed about what constitutes excellent teaching,learning, curriculum
materials and governance in an educative event? These questions will be
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answered in the remaining portion of this chapter, but before proceeding,
it is felt by this author that a brief overview of Gowin's theory of
educating and the educative event is required at this point.
A THEORY OF EDUCATING
For Gowin, a theory of educating centres around an educative event
with ~a teacher teaching meaningful material to a student who grasps the
meaning of the materials under humane conditions of social control. IIB
Embedded in this theory are the four commonplaces: teaching, curriculum,
learning and governance. 9 These concepts are briefly summarized in
the following paragraphs.
Teaching
~Teaching is the achievement of shared meaning in the context of
education. IIIO It is essentially a social event in which teacher and
student come to share meaning. In sharing meaning with a student, a
teacher intentionally strives to change and enrich the meaning of
experience for that student. In order to achieve shared meaning a teacher
uses curriculum materials. The student is responsible for grasping the
meaning of the materials and for ensuring that they are the meanings the
teacher intended. An educative event has occurred when meaning is shared
between teacher and student.
Learning
Learning is the reorganization of meaning which has already been
grasped. It is the responsibility of the student to choose to grasp the
meaning of something and proceed to learn it. Learning is achieved via
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the techniques of concentration, mastery, practise, exercise and drill.
Gowin sees learning as intentional, Bin deliberate learning we act to
reorganize old meanings with the help of new meanings to make a new pattern
of relation. I • 11 It should be noted that Gowin stresses the idea that an
educative event must be an experience of value for a student to feel the
significance of it and proceed to learn. 12 In order for an experience to
possess value it must have meaning for an individual.
Curriculum
In order to achieve shared meaning a teacher uses curriculum materials.
Curriculum is Jl a logically connected set of conceptually and pedagogically
analyzed knowledge and value claims~"13 It is the task of a teacher to
reconstruct knowledge claims for use in educating~ Prior to this~ the
teacher is responsible for analyzing the knowledge which is to be reconstructed
and for identifying the key concepts which the student will be required to
grasp.
Governance
Governance is the term Gowin uses to denote the social environment
that educative events occur in~ Essentially the administration of an
educative setting "controls the meaning that controls the effort.,,14
Governance brings together teachers, learners and curriculums so that
shared and enriched meaning can occur.
Recapitulating briefly, this author feels that both metaphilosophy
and educating are concerned with the quest for evidence for the excellence
of knowledge claims. World hypotheses can provide individuals with
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alternative ways of understanding what constitutes the nature of excellence
in educative events. The methods used by formism, mechanism, contextual ism
and organicism to construct knowledge claims about educational excellence
will now be examined.
The following paragraphs will attempt to demonstrate some of the
strengths and weaknesses of the root metaphor of formism applied to
educational commonplaces. No doubt other relationships could also be
demonstrated, but a comprehensive overview is not the task of this thesis.
Rather it is the intent to demonstrate that world hypotheses can provide
a conceptual framework for interpreting educational excellence.
FORMISM/TEACHING, LEARNING, CURRICULUM,
GOVERNANCE - SOME CONCEPTUAL RELATIONSHIPS
Formism and Teaching_,~,
Teaching may be considered excellent when it results in the achievement
of shared meaning about knowledge constructs that have been judged to be
inherently valuable. Teaching is concerned with enriching the meaning of
a student1s experience of a knowledge claim~ In order to achieve shared
and enriched meaning a teacher uses curriculum materials which have been
judged to contain excellent knowledge claims. These claims are usually
found to be excellent because they possess a version of truth about
reality, some criteria about beauty or artistic merit, some ethical
judgement, or a statement about the value of something.
Teaching however is not merely concerned with the provision of
knowledge claims. A good teacher also strives for ,excellence by sharing
evidence about the nature of knowledge claims. Arthur N. Geddis in his
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article entitled: Teaching: A Study in Evidence, comments:
To the degree to which teachers are concerned with fostering
rationality, critical thinking, and autonomy in their students,
they are committed to a concept of teaching which presents
reasons and evidence in support of knowle~~e claims as well as
the specific knowledge claims themselves.
Formism provides teachers with one set of categories to organize knowledge
claims in preparation for sharing with their students. Consider for
example the method formism offers for interpreting the truth of a knowledge
claim.
Formism provides an interpretation of the reality of the world as
comprised of ideal uni versal forms which" knowledge claims participate in.
The truth of a knowledge claim is judged by its correspondence with an
ideal. Formism offers a correspondence theory of truth. For example,
consider a child making a knowledge claim about a picture he or she has
drawn in the statement IIthis is a picture of the sunil. The truth of this
claim is judged by the degree to which thechild1s representation is similar
to the ideal universal form of the sun which to a formist possesses
characteristics of roundness, brightness, etc. To the extent that the
child1s picture manifests these qualities, then the picture may be judged
to be a true representation of the sun. The aesthetic excellence of the
drawing would be judged by the degree to which it manifested the ideal.
The greater the similarity to the ideal~ the greater the aesthetic value
of the respresentation. Summarizing, formism is one method teachers can
use to interpret and share the evidence for the excellence of knowledge
claims with their students.
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Formism also contributes to teaching by providing an interpretation
of the concept of an ideal teacher for use those responsible for
teacher training. Such a concept is likely to contain many categories of
ideal forms, i.e. ideal teachers communicate in specific ways, prepare
their curriculum materials in particular ways, etc. According to a formist,
the more closely a teacher approximates this ideal, he or she will be
judged to be an excellent teacher.
Consider the category of an ideal teacher as a provider of evidence
for knowledge claims. Formism requires that a teacher exposes students
to the object or concept being judged and exposes them to a knowledge of
the object or concept in its ideal form so that the students may judge the
truth or value of a claim by its correspondence to the ideal. ~Teach~rs
are judged to be good at their job to the extent to which they can accomplish
this task. Current teacher training applies a formistic approach in the
organization and creation of ideal teacher roles trainees are expected
to conform to.
It should be noted, however, that formism runs the risk of becoming a
coercive and uncompromising method if too rigid an adherence to an ideal
is demanded. Geddis notes:
••• it is very easy for the teacher to believe that his or her
concept of the form is identical with the form itself. Every
critique of education has its own story of student initiative
being squelched by some overly rigid formist - the novel solution
dismissedbecauseitwasn1tfound in the teacher 1 s manual ••• If
the formist is to avoid this rigidity he or she needs to
continually strive to remain open to alternative interpretations
in order to see the ways in which the same fact might be
interpreted differently in the light of a ~~fferent form ••• mortals
can only perceive ideal forms imperfectly.
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A good formistic teacher should have a knowledge of the alternate ideal
forms of an object or concept in order to avoid rigidity.
Formism also implies that there is an ideal act of teaching. Gowin
practises formismwhen he alludesto a concept of an ideal teaching
situation. He states that an episode of teaching has occurred when shared
meaning has been achieved due to the fulfillment of responsibilities on
the part of both the teacher and the student. I?
Reiterating briefly, formism offers (1) a method for interpreting
knowledge claims and the evidence for the excellence of knowledge claims,
(2) an interpretation of the concept of an ideal teacher and (3) an
interpretation of the concept of an ideal act of teaching. These are only
a few of the many possible applications of formism to teaching.
Formism and Learning
A necessary and prior condition for learning to occur is the grasping
of meanings. Once a meaning is grasped an individual deliberately reorganizes
old meanings assisted by the new meaning. A new pattern of relationships
is then formed·. Formism is related to such a concept of learning in so
far as grasping meaning and reorganizing old meanings in terms of new ones
are characteristics participating in a Ilform ll known as del iberate learning.
The achievement of excellence is related to how closely an individual
brings both these tasks to an ideal closure and in so doing, enriches his
or her meaning of an experience. Formism offers learners and educators
alike, an interpretation of ideal learning which is centered on a concept
of learning as deliberate and intentional.
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Formism and the Curriculum
The concept of standardized or normative curricula is the result of
a formistic approach for organizing and presenting knowledge claims. In
the practice of educating people to become educators the formistic world
view has contributed to the design of curricula which possess norms or
standards of kndwledge teachers must familiarize themselves with and
master before being judged to be an expert in a particular field of study.
Each curriculum area has its own norms, corresponding to knowledge claims
that are considered excellent enough to warrant being taught, i.e. a
science curriculum possesses different norms than a social studies
curriculum. These norms are related to the excellence of claims in
providing knowledge judged to be valuable enough to assist educators_to
maintain cultural continuity.
Curricula often refle,ct the world view that was used to design them.
The world view inherent in a particular curriculum may then be projected
to students. Kilbourn, in his work relating world hypotheses to curricula,
is concerned that the world views portrayed in classrooms via curricula
have potential long term consequences for both students and society. 18
Formism interprets the' knowledge claims in a curriculum to be ideal norms
for the student to conform to and to master well, in order to be found
to be a good student. Caution however must be used to ensure against a
rigid adherence to these norms which might stifle other creative and
equally excellent alternatives; i.e. students should not be taught to
conform to normative literary styles and genres at the expense of alternative
forms of expression.
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Formism and Governance
Recall that earIlerin this chapter, governance was defined as the
control or power necessary to bring together teaching, curriculum and
learning in a social setting. Gowin notes:
•.• these events almost always involve a sharing of power.
Teachers, typically have power over students, but the curriculum
has power Qverteachers ••• The sharing of meaning between
teachers and le~ers and curriculum requires the co-operation
of all parties •.
Governance harmonizes these three commonplaces so that an educative event
can occur.
Formism conceptually relates to governance in so far as governance
is concerned with administering social justice. Policies desgined for the
purposes of controlling are really the normative standards of an
institution in the formistic sense. Such policies in an educational setting
are ideals which teachers and students conform to and which guide the
designs of curricula.
Thus far, this chapter has outlined a few of the possible conceptual
relationships that arise when formism is used to interpret excellence in
educative commonplaces. This author feels that at this point, a
schematic summary of these conceptual relationships would be helpful.
Presented hereafter, is a schematic which is a modified structure of
J. M. Novak1s "Go-Pep" Inviting Educative Events Research Model.20
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TABLE I: SUMMARY OF SOME EXAMPLES OF CONCEPTUAL
RELATIONSHIPSBETW£ENPORMISMANDTHEFOUREDUCATIVE COMMONPLACES
World Hypothesis Educational Commonplace
FORMISM
(based on the
root metaphor
of similarity)
Teaching
- provides
, evidence for
excellence of
knowledge
claims
-provides concept
of ideal teacher
-provides concept
of ideal ·'act of
teaching
Learning
-provides
concept of
ideal
learning
as
intentional
reorganization
of old
rreanings
Curriculum
-provides
concept of
nonnative
curricula
for teacher
education
and for
student
mastery
Governance
-provides
concept of
normative
policy
standards
for use in
adninistering
social justice
The following paragraphs will attempt to demonstrate some of the
possible results of applying mechanism to interpret educational excellence
in teaching, learning, curriculum and governance. Strengths and weaknesses
of the root metaphor applied to the educational commonplaces will also be
discussed.
MECHANISM/TEACHING, LEARNING, CURRICULUM,
GOVERNANCE - SOME CONCEPTUAL RELATIONSHIPS
Mechanism and Teaching
Mechanism can provide an alternative interpretation of the evidence
for the excellence of knowledge claims~ For example, mechanism offers a
theory of truth which is based on a concept of cause and effect or action/
reaction. Truth becomes a name for whatever causes an individual to react
or adjust to his or her environment. ~~hatever causes or is inferred to
cause a reaction or an effect is the truthful version of reality, i.e.
a mechanist infers that some force was required to move object X from point
A to point B. A reaction has occurred and therefore the existence of some
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initiating action or cause is thought to be real.
Evidence in mechanistic terms is often quantitatively measurable
and methods of measurement and calculation are used frequentlysr i.e. a
teacher must supply numerical value 'and evidence for the force which is
thought to have moved object X from point A to' point B. Mechanism is
easi ly all ied with the teaching of science cur'ricula because of the use
of quantitative methods in providing evidence about knowledge claims.
Cause and effect occurrences that are quantitatively measurable are
easily interpreted by the categories of mechanism.
Mechanism is somewhat less adequate as a method for interpreting
evidence about qualitative experiences. Mechanism interprets aesthetic
excellence as something which causes a pleasurable reaction in a person;
i.e. a mechanistic teacher interprets the evidence for the aesthetic
excellence of a poem!!! by stressing the ability of the poem or its parts
to create a pleasurable effect.
Mechanism also provides a connective method for thinking about the
act of teaching. It presents a method for discovering what factors
influence teaching, what causes a teacher to be excellent and what
results from excellent teaching. Essentially mechanism describes a
connecti ve framework of all the cause 'and effect relationships which
surround the act of teaching. To the extent that these cause and effect
relationships create an experience of shared meaning between teacher
and student, an educative event has occurred. If the shared meaning
has IIfelt significance ll for the teacher' and/or student then a sense of
pleasure, worth or accomplishment results and the educative moment may be
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judged to be good and valuable. One of the criteria of educational
excellence is achieved in judging something to be valuable and meaningful
in life.
Meehan i sm and Learn ing
Meehan i sm' provides a connective interpretation of thec-ausa-l factors
affecting deliberate learning~ Excellence in learning is centered on a
concept of a student intentionally acting to reorganize an existing pattern
of meaning. Mechanism interprets this reorganization as a resultant
effect caused by the student making the connection between what is to be
learned and what is already known,. Learning in mechanistic terms is seen
as necessary for an individual to adjust to his or her environment.
Learning causes essential adjustment.
Mechanism and the Curriculum
From a mechanistic perspective, excellent curriculum materials offer
evidence fot the truth, beauty~ justice and value of things in cause and
effect terms. James Quina in his work on ARRoot Metaphor and Interdisciplinary
Curriculum ll offers a concept of mechanism as a blueprint for curriculum
design. Curriculum designed from a mechanistic viewpoint II stresses
action and reaction, stimulus and response and challenges students and
teachers to ask the questions when, where, how much, how often. 1I21
Geddis caution~ however, that the evaluation of such curricular items
relies heavily on measurement and calculation to produce evidence for
claims of knowledge and excellence. An individual must be careful not to
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cultivate a ~tendency to restrict and assign value only to meanings which
can be quantified. He states:-:
••• It is mucht'oo easy for both students and teachers to become
preoccupi-ed with getting the right answer.~.• to as high an accuracy
as possible without giv~2g sufficient consideration to what it is
that is being measured.
Essentially this is a plea to not use the mechanistic method to the
exclusion of qualitative interpretations of life. The excellence of
knowledge claims contained in a curriculum should also be qualitatively
Mechanism and Governance
Excellence in governance is related to its ability to control the
meaning that controls the educative event, and harmonizes the commonplaces
of teacher, curriculum and learner. Mechanism interprets this excellence
by providing a concept which stresses a hierarchial chain of measurable
action/reaction relationships from the level of society down through to
administrators, to teachers and finally down to the students. Mechanism
offers connective evidence about what factors contribute to good
administration, and what results are obtained from good administration.
Finally mechanism provides evidence about the cause and effect nature
of the interrelatedness of the four educative commonplaces. In stressing
the integral connectedness of teaching, learning, curriculum and
governance, Gowin applies a mechanistic viewpoint to the degree that good
governance is seen to cause a harmonious effect between teaching, learning
23and curriculum.
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Table II is a surnmaFy:_, of theeoTIceptswhich have been outlined in
this chapter in applying the mechanistic perspective to the interpretation
of excellence in educative commonplaces.
TABLE I I : SUMMARY .OF SOME CONCEPTUAL ,RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
MECHANISM AND THE FOUR EDUCATIVE COMMONPLACES
World Hypothesis Educational Commonplace
MECHANISM(based on the
root metaphor
of the
machine)
Teaching
~provision of
evidence for
excellence of
knowledge claims
~connective rrethod
for thinking
about act of
teaching
Learning
-provides
connective
cause/effect
interpretation
of intentional
learning
Curriculum
-cause/effect
design of
curriculun
Governance
-concept of
cause/effect
relationship'
between
governance and
other three
carrronp1aces
Contextual ism also offers a method for interpreting excellence in
the elements of the educative event. The application of the
contextualistic perspective to educative commonplaces will now be
examined.
CONTEX,TUALISM!TEACHI NG , LEARNING, CURRICULUM~,p
, GOVERNANCE .. SOME CONCEPTUAL RELATIONSHIPS
Contextual ism and Teaching
Contextualism offers'teachers a method for providing evidence about
the excellence of knowledge claims. For example, contextual ism offers an
operational theory of truth~ As situations or events change, so does the
version of truth about their nature. There may be many alternative
solutions to a problem and these will change as the context of the problem
changes. Contextual ism provides changeable evidence for a constantly
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changing universe.
Judgements about what is meaningful and valuable in life, or what
is beautiful, fair, ethical or truthful will alter according to the
context of the situation. Contextual ism provides for a changing and
adaptable concept of educational excellence.
Teaching in a contextualistic sense is to teach within the parameters
of a particular problem. It is a method which strives to make curriculum
relevant to students· experience. There 1s a potentially negative aspect
of this in that it can lead to a notion of relativistic knowledge in
which all theories are judged to be good ~s long as they provide an
answer to the immediate problem., Contextualism may immerse itself in
particulars at the expense of judging the general validity of a situation. 24:
Contextual ism and Learning
Recall that learning requires an individual to grasp the meaning of
what is to be learned. Once a meaning is grasped an individual intentionally
reorganizes old meanings in terms of new ones, forming new patterns of
relationships.
From a contextualistic perspective~ the meaning of an educative
event is unique because of the situation,it occurs in. The meaning of an
educative event depends on the particular set of circumstances brought
to bear upon the situation. An educative moment has meaning because of
a particular interplay of teacher, learner, curriculum and governance
which occurs at a particular moment in time. The grasped meaning of the
learner is specific to the context in which the event occurs. Any
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alteration in any of the commonplace elements changes the meaning of the
educative event. Contextual ism perceives learning and the attainment of
meaning as situational, alterable and constantly changing.
Contextual ism and the Curriculum
Curricula are designed and evaluated within the context of desired
goals and objectives. This is a contextualist concept. Arising from
this is the implication that those who know and understand the context of
the goals and objectives of a curriculum should be responsible for
developing the curriculum.
Curriculum material cannot be evaluted in contextualistic terms
however, without considering the contributions of the teacher and student
to the educative moment, i.e. the results of a test item designed to test
a specific ability to achieve in the context of a partiuclar goal, must
also be recognized as being effected by a student1s health, readiness, etc.,
at the time of the test. From the perspective of contextualism~ curriculum
materials are excellent if they provide knowledge claims which are flexible
enough to give meaning to our perception of a constantly changning universe.
Contextual ism and Governance
Applying the contextualistic world view creates flexibility and open
mindedness in administration. This allows for the practise of situational
ethics and situational justice which is particularly necessary in governing
human behaviour. Exceptions to the rule become possible when a
contextualistic viewpoint is applied.
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The revisioning and revitalizing of educational policies to reflect
the changing reality of the times Qlfl e also inherently a contextualistic
concepts. According to a contextualistic interpretation excellence in
governance is unique to each educative event.
TABLE III: SUMMARY OF CONCEPTUAL RELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN CONTEXTUALISM-ANO-THE FOUR EDUCATIVE COMMONPLACES
World Hypothesis
CONTEXTUAL ISM
(based on the
root metaphor
of an event in
its context)
Teaching
-provision of
evidence for
excellence of
knowledge
claims
-realistic
teaching
Educational Commonplace
L~~rfiing Curriculum
-specificity of -specificity of
grasped curriculum
rreaning design
-evaluate in
context of
educative
nment
Governance
-situationaljustice
....revisioning
policy
Organicism as it interprets excellence in teaching, learning, curriculum
and governance is discussed in the following paragraphs.
ORGANICISM/TEACHING, CURRICULUM, LEARNING,
GOVERNANCE --SOME CONCEPTUAL RELATIONSHIPS
Organicism and Teaching
A teacher who is intent on providing evidence for knowledge claims
using the method of an organicist must prove that what is being taught
integrates disparate facts. Teaching from an organicist viewpo'int IItraces
out th,e interconnections bet\\Ieenfacts ••• and sho\vs how each fact is of
critical importance to the whole. 1I25
Organicist teaching attempts to maximize the interconnectedness of
what a student learns and stresses the choerency of facts that produce an
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integrated concept for the student to grasp the meaning of. Evidence
for the excellence of knowledge claims is proportional to the degree of
coherence amongst facts.
The concept of Iiteach the whole chi ld ll deri ves from an organicist
viewpoint that the child is a totality comprised of social, physical,
emotional and intellectual aspects. These aspects are all integrally
related to produce a unique child with particular needs. Current
educational theory encourages the development of educational experiences
which enrich the total child.
Organicism and Learning
From the perspective of an organicist, excellence in learning is
related to the ability of a student to grasp meanings as I'integrated
totalities. 1I Meaning is enriched for students when they perceive knowledge
claims and events in the world as wholes in relation, to their parts.
Organicism implies that the nature of the world may be known as a holistic
reality. Events in the world should be understood and grasped as
totalities.
For exam~le, organicism would consider that the integration of
governance, teaching, curriculum and learning produces the IItotality ll
called the lI educative event. 1I From an organicistls viewpoint, educative
events should be judged according to the degree to which they represent
an integrated whole. Each interconnection between the commonplaces is
important in producing the final totality.
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Organicism and the Curriculum~"
Curriculum materials are considered to be excellent if they encourage
a vision of knowledge claims as wholes i'n relation to thei r parts, i.e.
poems are perceived as integrated wholes comprised of smaller elements.
Organicism is operationally evident in some current curricula~ Health and
physical education curricula stress holistic concepts. Skill development
in physical education activities is an organistic concept in its
emphasis of the whole-part-whole method of skill acquisition. The biological
sciences are stressing holistic concepts in the presentation of the study
of ecosystems. Additionally the sociological fields present such holistic
concepts as II man and society".
Organicism and Governance
Governance is holistically conceived of as the integration of many
factors producing lI a totalityll which controls meaning and effort. Integrating
teachers, students and curricula to produce the totality known as an
educative event, is the task of governance. Balancing the needs of teachers,
students and society is the process by which integration occurs. This
balancing,howeve~ is largely dependent on a sense of mutual understanding
between all concerned parties. An educative event is integrated when
teachers, stUdents, curricula and administrators co~operate in order to
meet individual and collective needs. Excellence in governance is
related to the ability to produce an integrated, holistic educative event.
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TABLE l~~ SUMMARY OF SOME CONCEPTUAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
ORGAN ICISM AND THE· FOUR t[JUCATI.VE COMMONPLACES
World Hypothesis Educational Commonplac~.
Teachfng Learning Curriculum Governance
ORGANICISM
(based on the
root metaphor
of an
integrative
whole)
Summary
-provision of
evidence for
excellence of
knowledge claims
-concept of teach
the whole child
-teaching part of
holistic
educative event
-grasp rreanings
as holistic
realities
-learning part
of holistic
educative
event
-present materials -a totality
in tenms of controlling
wholes in rreaning and
relation to hanmonizing
their parts of teaching,
-curricullll1 part learning,
of holistic curriculum
educative -governance
event part of
holistic
educative
event
Chapter II has been an attempt to demonstrate to the reader that world
hypotheses contribute to a conceptual framework of educational excellence
in several ways. First, in so far as education is concerned with providing
evidence for the excellence of knowledge claims to enrich the meaning of
an individuals experience, w'orld hypotheses can provide different methods
for structurally corroborating evidence.
These methods derive from the root metaphors of formism, mechanism,
contextual ism and organicism. For example~ the world hypotheses offer
four different interpretations about the truth of knowledge claims. Formism
provides a correspondence theory of truth, mechanism - a cause and effect
theory of truth, contextualism - an operational theory of truth and
organicism - a coherence theory of truth.
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Second, world hypotheses can provide a variety of cognitive styles
for use in teaching which can benefit a variety of learning styles.
Suppose a teacher is proficient in reorganizing the four world hypotheses
in operation. Thus, knowing that a student holds a particular view of
nature i.e. organistic, the teacher has a basis for presenting new
knowledge to the student in terms of the studentls perceptual framework.
The task of the teacher in order to share meaning with a student is
to select the world hypothesis which will best incorporate the analogies
used by the student to construct reality. Additionally, a teacher in
enriching a studentls meaning of knowledge claims should introduce the
student to other world hypotheses. This should help the student to
realize that the knowledge he or she organizes in one way can be
organized in other ways.
Third, an educator who is cognizant of world hypotheses gains b9th
a broader and more precise comprehension of knowledge for use in creating
and applying ~urricula to the variety of perceptual viewpoints that
learners bring to the educative event.
Fourth, an administrator who is cognizant of the variety of ways in
which knowledge may be conceptually organized will have a deeper
understanding of his or her task in controlling the meaning and effort
that constitutes an educative event.
In conclusion, the adoption of a particular world view shapes the
way teachers teach, learners learn, the aims and objectives of educative
materials and the governance"'of educative events. Figure II is a concept
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map which summarizes the relationships discovered in this chapter between
world hypotheses and excellence in an educative event.
In connecting the world hypotheses of formism, mechanism, contextual ism
and organicism to Gowin1s educational commonplaces, reference has been
made to1~he work of Geddis, who connected Pepperls metaphilosophy to
educating in his perspective of teaching asa study in evidence. Reference
has also been made to the work of Kilbourn and Quina both of whom see a
relevant connection between world hypotheses and curriculum~ Additionally
reference has been made to the work of Novak who feels that systematically
applying root metaphors offers a research perspective for an inviting
approach to education.
Chapter III contains a detailed explication of Pepper1s fith world
hypothesis termed selectivism and the "root metaphor it originated from.
The work of Efron, Monast and Armstrong will be discussed briefly as
scholars who have concerned themselves with Pepper1s selectivism.
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CHAPTER III
SEL EC.T I \1 I sr~' '
INTRODUCTION
Later in his career, Pepper began to articulate and defend a
metaphysical theory of his own, "Jhich he terrned Jlselectivismu. He
proposed selectivism as a new Hfifthllworld hypothesis. Reflecting perhaps
on his own need to contribute something new and original to speculative
philosophy, or perhaps in anticipation of collegial analysis and
criticisms, Pepper also describedselectivism as possibly a Hradical
..
revision ll of the older world hypothesis - "contextual ism.
In his writings The Sources of Value and Concept and Quality, Pepper1s
major works dealing with selectivism, there is evidence that he is somewhat
cautious about the nature of selectivism as a II new" world hypothesis.
He considers alternative possibilities regarding the nature ofselectivis~.
This does not however characterize his writing as confused or ecl~ctic
but rather reflects Pepper1s adherence to the notion of world hypotheses
as inadequate until sufficient evidence can be amassed to corroberate their
status.
Sonle consideration will be given in Chapter IV to crttiquing the
nature of selectivism as a fifth adequate \A/orld hypothes/is. However, to
do justice to suchan inquiry would require an analysis which is beyond
the realm of this thesis. VJhether selectivism eventually gains the identi·ty"
of a new world hypothesis or a revised contextual ism or a conglomerate of
the earlier world hypotheses, it is felt by this author that it has an
important contribution to make to the concept of educating and the pursuit
of excellence. It is the relevance of selectivism to edueating and
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educational excellence that is the concern of this thesis. Other authors
have studied and critiquedselectivism for the purposes of determining
its status as a world hypothesis and brief reference will be made to
their work in Chapter IV.
This chapter will outline the development of selectivism from its
root metaphor to its application as a world theory capable of enriching
an individual1s comprehension of what is true, beautiful, ethical and
valuable in the world. If selectivism can accomplish such an enrichment
of comprehension, then a further contribution of metaphilosophy to
educational excellence will result. In this chapter selectivism is
described beginning with an overview of its root metaphor. This is followed
by a description of its operational characteristics in various selective
systems. Finally there ensues an examination of selectivism as it
culminates in what Pepper terms the usocial adjustment theory. 1I 2
Similar to the other world hypotheses, selectivism is based on an
analogy or root metaphor originating in common sense. One of the common
sense facts that appears evident in the world is that human beings
voluntarily and intelligently engage in purposive activities. For this
reason Pepper chose the "purposive actH as the point of origin for the
world hypothesis he termed selectivism.
THE PURPOSIVE ACT· - A ROOT METAPHOR
Most complex forms of human activity arise from two basic and simple
types of purposive actvJhich may be described as lIappetit'iveu and
lIaversiveu. In an appetitive act an individual purposely seeks a goal
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to satisfy a particular drive, such as when a person leaves a room in
search of water to satisfy thirst. 3 In an aversive act an individual
purposely avoids negative or painful experiences, such as when a person
flees a garden on encountering a swarm Df bees.4
Describing a purposive act may be accomplished via two routes. One
is to use the introspective method and Dbtain a description of the lived
qualitative aspects of the purposive act which are experienced and
described by an individual. The other is to externally describe the
structure of a purposive act by extrapolating on the observed behaviour of
an indivdual engaged in purposive activity. In otherwo'rds, a purposive
act may be described qualitatively and/or conceptually. Consequently
selectivism is deemed to bea world hypothesis which can offer evidence
about the nature of the world in both conceptual and qualitative IIfelt ll
,terms. The following paragraphs summarize Pepper1s analysis and
description of the structures of both the appetitive and aversive
purposive acts in conceptual and qualitative terms.
THE STRUCTURE OF AN ,APPETITIVE ACT OR POSITIVE PURPOSE
Returning for a'moment to the example cited earlier of an individual
purposely leaving a room to seek water, it is apparent that there are a
number of characteristics which comprise such an act. First, the act
has an end result, or a goal, which in this case is to obtain water.
Second, the act possesses a drive or an impulse related to the goal, i.e.
the thirstimpulse~ Third, such an'act is comprised of a series of stages
or subordinate acts \'Jhich an individual nlust successfully complete before
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accomplishing the ultimate goal i.e. the individual in a room, driven
by thirst must rise, walk out of the room, down a hall until reaching
a water fountain and drinking. Getting up, leaving the room, etc. are
examples of subordinate acts brid~ingthe gap between the thirst drive
and the ultimate obtainment of water.
These subordinate acts may be thought of as trials which are
anticipated by the individual as alternatives or ways and means of
obtaining the final goal. I~ for example, an individual on leaving the
room and walking down the hall discovered no water fountain, he or she
would reanticipate a water fountain might perhaps be located somewhere
else and proceed to try another route. The important point is that if
the need for water arose again under the same conditions, the individual
would no longer anticipate that water would be located at a water
fountain down the original hall. The individual would have learned
the error of the previous anticipation and would not repeat it.
The fourth component of the purposive activity is that there are
subordinate goals which are obtained following correct anticipations as
the impulse travels to its ultimate goal, i.e. when the thirsty individual
reaches the hallway - it can be said that he or she has reached the goal
of the anticipation, IIthat there would be ahallwayll which might lead to
water. There are successive intermediate goals to be anticipated and
obtained before reaching the final goal. Figure VII represents the
structure of a purposive act as outlined by Pepper.5
Drive or Impulse
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Subordinate or Trial Acts Goal
QP
n
FIGURE III': SCHEMATIC OF APPETITIVE PURPOSE
In the schernatic above 0= the drive or impulse \vhich IIcharges ll the
individual to act, An = an anticipatory set or trial, 12 = an impulse
given for A~, og = a goal object of a particular anticipatory set and
QP refers to the quiescence pattern or final consummatory act or goal
which satisfies the original drive motivating the act.
Overlaying the example of a thirsty individual seeking water on
top of the schematic of an appetitive purpose produces the following
conceptual description:
Drive or Impulse
= (Thirst drive)
= Anticipatory set
for H20
12lA~ = Anticipatory set
for turning handleII of water fountian
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Subordisate or Trial Acts Goal
QP = drinks
H20 and
tnirst
dissipates
o~ = Turns handle
1\ of waterQP fountain
3
= Anticipatory set
for finding water
fountain
oj = finds water
fountain
= Anticipatory set for
vJa l!( i ng down tile
hallway
16l:A~ = Anticipatory set for
rising from chair
= Anticipatory set for
leaving the room
o~ a walks down theII hallway
QP5
09 - leaves the roomf-
Q~
o~ = rising out of chair
FIGURE IV: SCHEMATIC OF AN EXAMPLE OF AN APPETITIVE PURPOSE
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In the aforementioned schematic, oy is the goal object of A~ and
o~ is the goal object of A~ etc. When an individual is thirsty, he
or she thinks or anticipates that water will quench the thirst~ (A~ ).
Such a thought gives rise to an impulse for a subordinate thought that
turning on a water fountain will ~roduce water {I2 - A~) etc~ The
attainment of each subordinate goal produces a quiescence which leads
the individual to proceed to accomplish the next goal, i.e. finding the
water fountain allows an individual to proceed to the thought of turning
the fountain on. When water is finally obtained and consumed the thirst
drive is dissipated. Indeed after the thirst drive is quiescent an
individual may continue to drink the water leisurely and enjoy the
sensation of consuming its· coolness and taste. For this reason IIpleasurell
is often the value associated with the <consummatory phase of an appetttive
purpose.
Pepper stresses the importance of realizing that the original drive
motivates both the need for water as well as all of the anticipatory sets
or trials which guide the individual to the attainment of water. The IIdrive u
charges both the end and the means of obtaining the end. Pepper terms
this characteristic of the drive in a purposive act its split dynamics. 6
Pepper offers an excellentde-scr:iptio-n of spl it dynamics in the following
paragraph.
When we want the means for an end, we want the means because we
want the end. Our wanting of the end goes on all the time that
we are wanting the means,- and it is the continuous wanting of the
end that keeps us wanting the means. So the wanting7gets splitbetween the end and the means for attaining the end.
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The occurrence of the split dynamics results in some trial or
subordinate acts being correct and some incorrect. When an anticipation
is blocked or a subordinate goal turns out to be unattainable or an
incorrect means of obtaining the ultimate goal, an individual selects
another trial or method of obtaining the end goal. The incorrect act is
discarded from the individual's thought pattern. Conversely correct acts
which bring the 'individual closer to his or her final goal are selected
and taken into that person's cognitive structure and may be recalled
again if a similar situation ever arises.
Selecting correct behaviours for ensuring survival in future situations
is the systematic' process which Pepper ter,ms selectivism. Selecting
correct subordinate acts or trials is what, an individual does when
confronted with the attainment of a goal in a new environment. For Pepper
the selectivism inherent in this trial and error purposive activity is
also an instinctive technique of action which occurs when an individual
is blocked from the attainment of a goal or the quiescence of a drive.8
The trial and error activity is necessary to bridge the gap between a
drive and its quiescence. Thus, the structure of the appetitive purposive
act, with is characteristic selective trial and error activity guiding an
individual to the attainment of certain ends based on the dynamics of
specific needs, gives rise to the process of selectivism.
The description of the structure.o'f an appett"tive purpose, which has
been outlined, fits either an introspective qualitative description of
the activity ora conceptual behaviouristic and objective description. The
description of anticipatory sets or anticipations i$ an introspective and
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qualitative account of observed behaviour. It is a description of the
inner feelings of someone anticipating water to reduce thirst. The
enjoyment of consuming the water after a thirst has been quenched is a
description of a qualitative inner feeling. These characteristics may
also be described however in conceptual and objective terms. Anticipations
may be viewed as hypothetical concepts which expla\n how~ an organism
engages in puposive activity and moves from· a drive charged state to a
state of quiescence. ile the qualitative and the conceptual descriptions
or categories of an appetitive purposive act are themselves concepts,
the conceptual categories are only obtainable from an external observer of
the behaviour.
For Pepper, the dualism in nature between qualitative experience and
conceptual analysis, between aesthetics and scientific method, becomes a
natural and inherent dualism visible in selectivism in the structure of
a purposive act. Indeed such dualism is seen as essential for a fuller
and more comprehensive knowledge of the world. Extrapolating on this,
selectivism as a world hypothesis appears to claim that knowledge is best
gained by the methods and perspectives of philosophers and scientists alike.
As such, selectivism may possess the' potential for bringing about a
harmonious state between the various cognitive and aesthetic experiences
of mankind. Further references to this potential will be encountered as
the reader proceeds through the development of selectivism in this chapter.
At this point it is sufficient to realize that the descriptions of human
appetitive activities are both qualitative and conceptual o~ in other
terms~subjective and objective.
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The next few paragraphs will dwell briefly on a description of the
aversive act, the other form of human purposive activity identified by
Pepper. Similar to the appetitive Bct the description of the aversive
act will be seen to be both qualitative and conceptual.
THE STRUCTURE OF AN AVERSIVE ACT - THE AVOIDANCE
OF NEGATIVE EXPERIENCE
Individuals engage in aversive, behaviour in order to avoid painful
experience. The aversive act differs from the appetitive structurally,
because its impulse or drive is not towards a final goal , but ratheravvay
from a negative experience. The avoidance of a negative or painful
experience is termed the riddance patten in the structure of an aversive
act. Only the absence of the offending or painful stimulus will bring an
individual quiescence or freedom from fear of pain. Recalling the
earl ier example of an indi vidual fleeing' a garden on encountering a SvJarm
of bees, the following schematic presents the conceptual structure of an
. . t 9averSIve purpOSIve ac •
R (riddance reaction
(object of apprehension
is sight of bees in
garden)
(object of apprehension
is sound of bees)
(object of apprehension
is bees in garden)
(apprehens'ion of Apr F Q of F
bee sting) ies-
cence
of
fear
(apprehension of AP
sight of bees in I
garden)
(apprehension of AP
sound of bees) 2
(apprehension for A~
the I i kel i hood of
bees in the garden)
FIGURE V: SCHEMATIC OF AN EXAf\ilPLE OF THE STRUCTUR:E OF AN AVERSIVE ACT
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In the example the apprehensive sets are fearful ideas and are motivated
by a fear drive impelling the individual away from bees and the pain
accompanying bee stings. Fear usually becomes attached to all the
circumstances of the situation so that not only is the final bee sting
feared but also the sound and sight of bees or of locations possibly
inhabited by them. The function of the structure of an aversive act is
to keep an individual away from harm.
Similar to an appeti.tive purpose~ the process of selecting correct
subordinate acts also occursin the-dynamics of an aversive act. Incorrect
choices of behaviour would be so labelled if they brought the individual
closer to harm, i.e. if a person did not fear the sound of bees but was
then bitten just after hearing one, the original lack of fear would be
discarded from his or her own thoughts. It would be replaced by the
correct subordinate aversive act of fearing the sound of bees which likely
would allow him or her to avoid being stung. Consequently the actual
fear of being stung would provide the impetus or drive for selecting
necessary behaviours to remove bees from one 1 s environment and rid the
individual of feelings of fear. The following paragraphs briefly summarize
the general conceptual and qualitative aspects of the two types of
purposive activity.
Conceptual descriptions produce an objective perspective of human
purposive behaviour structurally composed of drives or fears, anticipations
and apprehension~ objects of anticipations and apprehensions, satisfactions
of drives and riddance of fears or negativeness. Conceptually comparing
the structure of the two types of purposive activity it can be seen that
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anticipations lead individuals to satisfy particular needs in an appetitive
act and apprehensions lead individuals away from harmful environments or
negative experiences.
In addition, there are certain qualitative values associated with
purposive acts. The primary values associated with purposive acts are
the values of pleasure and pain, success and frustration. Feelingsof
pleasure and success are most often associated with the quiescence pattern
of the drive in an appetitive act~ Pain or displeasure are the values
associated with the riddance pattern of an aversive act. Displeasure
and frustration also occur with blocked anticipations or aversions in the
course of either purposive act. When this occurs an individual is
displeased and frustrated at being unable to reach an end or intermediate
goal, or conversely at being brought closer to a painful experience. While
pleasure and success are felt when an end goal is reached or a painful
experience avoided, these feelings are also felt whenever subordinate
anticipations and apprehensions reach their corresponding goal objects.
In other words, there are subordinate successes all along the course of a
purposive activity.
Clearly the structure of the purposive act proposed by Pepper possesses
both qualitative and conceptual aspects and, as an instrument for assisting
comprelJ:ensfoH, should therefore have appeal for scientists and phi losophers
alike. This author feels that the qualitative/conceptual aspect of its
structure will assist in demonstrating the potential contribution which the
purposive act and other selective systems may extend to a theory of
educational excellence. In Chapter V selectivism is argued as a basis
for educational excellence.
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Thus far, this chapter has described selectivism in its simplest
form; the root metaphor of purposive activity. The structures of the
two known types of purposiveactivity~ the appetitive and aversive acts
have been outlined. It has been demonstrated that these structures may
be known, described or understood in both qualitative and/or conceptual
terms, as these are innate aspects of purposive activity. The split
dynamics of both "the drive of an appetitive act and of an aversive act
exhibit selective behaviour. The same impulse that demands the reduction
of a drive likewise motivates all the instrumental acts necessary to reduce
the drive. If an instrumental act, anticipation or apprehension, is in
error~ then the original drive rejects it and selects another until the
individual has reduced his or her drive and avoided pain or displeasure. The
drive in the structure of eitherpurpo~ive act is the governing force which
guides individuals in their selection of right acts rather than wrong" ones.
Indeed the field of human ethics arises from selectivism as do our comprehensions
of truth, beauty and value. Evidence for' this is gi ven in the subsequent
discussions of other selective systems.
The structure of the purposive act, appetitive and aversive is the
simplest example or model of w~at Pepper terms selective systems. IO The
following selections deal with a discussion of the other selective systems
which Pepper identified and which culminate in what he termed the social
adjustment theory.
In his selectivistic world hypothesis, Pepper is essentially providing
a method for looking at and understanding the world in terms of human
systems. These systems operate by actively selecting valued human
behaviours necessary for the survival and happiness of individuals and
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societies. Comprehending the world from the perspective of selective
systems based on an analysis 6f purposive behaviour allows an individual
to ask questions about motivation, intention, human free will, individual
vs. collective good, and aesthetic quality, to name a few. In so far as
it accomplishes or presents this method of inquiry, selectivism contributes
to a broader~"interpretation of how the educational process might pursue
the notions of excellence. This is discussed in Chapter V.
Pepper identified eight selective systems in his work Concept and
Quality and it is the intent of this author in the next section of this chapter
to first identify these systems for the reader; second, to demonstrate
how each represents selectivism in operation; third, to describe the
hierarchial lines of legislation existing between these selective systems
and how such legislation gives rise to Pepperls theory of social
adjustment. Eight selective systems and the 'values and ethics associated
with them are identified and discussed in the follo\A/ing sections.
SELECTIVE SYSTEMS
The selective activity of- individual purposive activity has been the
topic of discussion thus far. There are however, other structures in
existence which contain elements of purposive acts and selective behaviour.
Pepper classified eight selective systems as follows: (1) Consummatory and
Riddance Fields, (2) Appetitive and Aversive Purposive Structures, (3)
Personal Situations, (4) Person'ality Structures, (5)::Social Situations, (6)
Social Institutions, (7) Cultural Patterns, and (8) Natural Selection. 11 Each
of these selective systems exhibits characteristic purposive activity and each
exists at a certain level of integration in the structure of the world and is
dependent upon the levels of systems above and below it.
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Outlining the higher levels of integration into which purposive
structures enter, the selective activity of the split dynamics of the
drives becomes more obvious~ Recall that the split dynamic nature of
a drive selects certain acts as good and others as bad in assisting an
individual to attain a goal or avoid pain. In addition to selecting the
good from the bad, there also exist differentiations between what act is
right or wrong~ brings pleasure or displeasure, success or failure.
Clearly the structure and dynamics of purposive activity function to
provide values and an ethical system necessary for human planning and
decision making~ Monast, a scholar who examined and critiqued Pepper1s
selectivism, felt that Pepper actually discovered selectivism in his
earlier articulations on value theory and ethics. 12
The hypothesis which Pepper established was that selective systems
are ~\lhat determine human values. He then defined selective systems
using the following definition he felt would cover all values an individual
might encounter in life:
A selective system is a structural process by which a unitary
dynamic agency is channelled in such a way that it generates
particular acts, dispositions~ or objects fto be called trials),
and also activates a specific selective agency (to be called lithe
normll) by which some of the trials are rejected and ot~~rs are
incorporated into the dynamic operation of the system.
It is the intent of this thesis now to examine the eight selective
systems identified by Pepper in light of the above definition. Essentially
the first four selective systems deal with the purposive behaviour of
individuals, while the remain'ing four refer to the behaviour of societal
groups of individuals. The first two selective systems will be reviewed
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only briefly as they have been the focus of discussion in this chapter
thus far, in outlining the structure of purposive activity. The selective
systems are reviewed with respect to the dynamic selection of values
inherent in each.
Consummatory and Riddance Fields
Earlier, in the discussion of the structure of an appetitive act the
final goal of purposive behaviour was identified as the quiescence of the
drive initiating the behaviour. The example was given of a thirsty
individual seeking water. The consummatory phase of the act occurred when
water was obtained and his or her thirst was quenched. Paralleling the
consummatory phase was the riddance pattern of an aversive act. Values
generated in the consummatory and riddance fields are lI affective values"
and are described as pleasant or unpleasant. 14 Pleasure is most often
associated with the consummatory phase of an appetitiVe act, such as the
obtaining of water to quench thirst and the enjoyment accompanying the cold
taste afterwards. Pain or displeasure is associated with the riddance
pattern of an aversive act and acts as the stimulus for initiating evasive
action to protect the individual. The example given was fear of pain from
bee stings. Thus the distinguishing characteristic which differentiates
appetitions from apprehensions in value terms is whether the final goal of
the purpose is positive and pleasure giving or is the riddance of something
unpleasant.
In summary, affective values are representative of an individual1s
basic needs and drives and represent the lowest level of integration in the
hierarchial schema of selective systems. The selective system immediately
-57-
above this level is known as the level of appetitive and aversive
purposive structures.
Appetitive and Aversive Purposive Structures
Human behaviour is also guided by the selection of decisions based
on values which Pepper terms conative-achievement values. 15 Conative-
achievement values refer to the success or failure of achieving desires
and needs. The values of success or failure are inherent in both the
appetitive and aversive types of purposive activity. Conation refers to
desire either for the achievement or aversion of something. Total achieve-
ment however is defined as both a phase of initial desire as well as a
final phase of successful attainment or aversion. This is why the values
of success vs. failure are termed conative-achievement values.
As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, success is the value
resulting when correct anticipations and apprehensions are selected by
the dynamics of a purposive act. Such successes may be intermittent in the
course of a purposive act and result in bringing an individual closer to
the attainment of his or her final desire. Additionally the attainment of
the firral goal and the quie'scence of the initiating desire or need also
yields a value of success. Paralleling this, the avoidance of an unpleasant
or painful object by getting rid of the offending object represents the
value of success in an aversive act.
If an individual in the course of attaining an end goal anticipates
incorrectly one or more of the means for obtaining it, frustration occurs
and these incorrect acts or anticipations will be discarded by the
individual. According to the dynamics of purposive behaviour, this is
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Ulearningll occurring in an individual adjusting to his or her environment.
Correct acts are selected and incorrect ones discarded. The selective
dynamic operates in aversive behaviour if an individual must avoid a
potentially harmful object in the environment. An anticipatory set or
apprehensive set which proves to be in error is valued as unsuccessful and
discarded from the guiding behaviours an individual uses to interact with
the environment.
In the process of an appetitive act it should be noted that affective
values dominate over the conative-achievement values. 16 By example
consider an individual satisfying his or her drive to quench a thirst
based only on achievement values. This would mean that the behaviour
exhibited would always be a mere gulping of water until thirst subsided,
since this would be the quickest way of attaining achievement of the goal.
This behaviour however, if sometimes indulged in at first, is usually
followed by a calm and obviously pleasurable drinking of water for its
coolness and taste. In otherword~the quiescence of the drive for
quenching thirst slows down and is ~aken over by the affective values in
the consummatory phase of an appetitive act. The dominance of affective
values over . conative achievement values is important to note for
subsequent discussions of Pepper1s concept of the lines of legislation
between selective systems.
Thus far, the first two levels in the hierarchial schema of selective
systems have been examined in respect to the values their split dynamics
yield. The next level of selective system which needs to be examined is
known as the IIpersonal situation".
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Personal Situation
Two selective systems with their corresponding values of success
vs. frustration and failure, and pleasant vs. unpleasant have been shown
to be generated by the single purposive act. However, most individuals
are involved in more than one purposive activity at the same time. In
otherwords behaviour is based on more than one need or desire occurring
simultaneously. This accounts for what Pepper terms the personal situation.I7
A personal situation is also a selective system. In a personal situation
each of the purposes occurring simultaneously in an individual has its
own drive for maximizing its own values. IE These drives and desires are
adjusted to one another so that a maximum value for these purposes acting as
a group or whole can be obtained. To the extent that a person is capable of
attaining maximum joint value from the many needs operating simultaneously
within himself or herself, that person may be said to be prudent. Failure
to obtain this joint value is imprudent.
Prudence and imprudence are the values yielded by the selective system
of the personal situation. Usually people behave in prudent ways because
committing an imprudent act can sometimes result in irreparable damage or
injury to oneself i.e., it is imprudent to step out in front of heavy
traffic crossing the street. However imprudent acts do occur and are the
result of incorrectly choosing the best 'means of attaining a desired end.
An example is crossing the street without the safety of stoplights to get
to the other side of a busy road.
Imprudent acts are also the result of misjudging or improperly selecting
what it is that will give oneself the most value at a particular time. In
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otherwords an error is sometimes made in adjusting all the drives and needs
occurring in an individual to produce a desired goal with particular
consequences. The consequences of the behaviour may be in error, however,
because of the ability to learn from reward and punishment, most
individuals do not repeat imprudent acts. Again, selective activity 'in
the system can be seen in the establishment of a collective value from
simultaneous needs and in the choosing of alternatives to reach this end
value. Incorrect choices are corrected for, not repeated, and are discarded
from an individuaPs cognitive structure.
To date, this section has examined the first three selective systems
dealing with the purposive behaviour of individuals. Moving up Pepper1s
hierarchy brings the reader to the last selective system associated with the
individual, that of personality structure.
Personality Structure
Personalities develop as a result of an individuallg personal and
social situations and personalities are, according to Pepper, selective
systems!9 There i~ however, a major difference which exists between the
selective system of the personality structure and the structures of single
purposive acts and personal situations. The difference is that the
intermediate means or trials for obtaining a desired end are not actual
instrumental acts in a personality structure but rather are dispositions
for these acts. The character traits in animdiv{dua~~spersonality are the
dynamic dispositions ready to go into action in appropriate sltuations.20
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Examples of these dispositions or traits are reflexes, basic
drives, capacities for learning, acquired habits, roles, egos, etc. Some
character traits are conscious and may be found in the ego and others are
unconscious and not subject to thevolunt8ry control of an individual.
Character traits are selected or discarded by the personality selective
system. In other words they are either incorporated into the personality
or rejected from it.
The drive in this selective system is the need for integration of
the personality. When character traits exist in this is the sign
of an integrated personality. If one characteristic conflicts with others
frustration occurs and such a disposition tends to be ejected from the
personality. In summary, the personality structure as a selective system
yields the values of an integrated personality or an unintegrated, neurotic
one.
The importance of the hierarchial nature of Pepper1s selective systems
becomes apparent when one realizes the greater application of the selective
dynamics of personality structure over the dynamics of personal situations
and single purposive acts. The selective system of a personality structure
selects characteristics which will be effective for a person1s lifetime.
This has a more wide ranging impact on an individual than the values selected
by specific acts. Consequently the personality structure is located higher
on the cosmic scale of selective systems.
Having completed an overview of the selective systems operating in the
purposive behaviour of individuals it is timenowto examine the selective
systems that generate social values. According to Pepperls hierarchy there
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are three major selective systems generating social value?l These are
the social situation, the social institution, and the cultural pattern.
The Social Situation
This system is selecti ve of acts performed by persons·i~h:d gocial
situation Ethical thinking is most often seen operating at this
particular level of selective systemobecause moral values emerge when
individuals have to decide what is right or wrong in their dealings with
other individuals.
In a social situation the dynamics of selectivism are seen operating
through the joint interests or needs1Df the persons involved in the
situation. The aim is to reduce tensions between individuals and to increase
satisfactions and, consequently, feelings of pleasure. Tension is reduced
by bringing the needs of the individuals concerned to quiescence or by
mutually attaining goals and desires. If an incorrect method of
accomplishing this is selected, tension in the social situation will in~rease
and the system must correct for this by choosing an alternative means to
accomplish joint or mutual satisfactions for the persons concerned.
Whenever people are together in a social situation the selective system
operating aims to reduce frustration and tension and maximize happiness.
The resultant values or acts yielded by this selective system are commonly
described as congenial or uncongenial to the situation.
When a person is involved in a social situation or she is also
involved in the social institution and cultural pattern in which the
situation arose. It is the selective system of the social institution
which will be examined next.
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The Social Institution
As a selective system the social institution can be seen operating
in the individuals and objects which comprise the institution. For example,
a religious institution is comprised of people, a church, and various
symbols representing the religion~ The acts selected or discarded by the
system of a social institution yield values of conformity and nonconformity.
Such a system sanctions conformity via (I) designated officials, i.e.
priests or police or the courts, (2) public approval or disapproval, and
(3) a personls own conscience which demands conformity to social customs
23and laws. Usually the internal sanctions of one~s conscience are
sufficient for an individual to conform to society to a certain degree and
external sanctions such as the courts or public approval are not required
to acculturate a person to his or her society.
Referring once again to the definition of a selective system, the
requirements of the institution represent the final goal of the purposive
behaviour, the means ofa£ht~ving the goal are through the acts of persons
subject to the institution; the drive instigating all of this is an
individual1s conscience - internal sanction, and external societal
pressure. Pepper offers the following description of these.
If a person is a member of a social institution he is committed
to the demands of the institution and by the same committment
to perform t~~ acts demanded by the institution as means to its
functioning.
While social institutions function as selective systems, they in turn
comprise the content of the larger selective system of a culture.
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The Cultural Pattern
Cultural patterns may be defined as a collection of social
institutions. 25 As a selective system, a culture or cultural pattern
yields the positive or negative values of harmony or discord. A culture
is harmonious if it can integrate the various social institutions
comprising it. The goal of societal integration is twofold. First it
represents the attainment of maximum satisfaction for the members of a
society. Second, it seeks the attainment of maximum security for society.
The important point to remember here is that these two needs are often
antagonistic to one anotherJ6 Consequently there are two types of social
integration and cultures which develop, namely the individualistic,
democratic society and the authoritarian society.
Pepper provides an excellent overview of the contrasts between these
two social integrations, which are outlined in TableV. 27
TABLE V: CONTRASTS OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION
Functional Authoritarian Society
I. Survival as dominant motive.
2. Basic right of society over
individual.
3. Centralization of government.
4. Efficiency as chief aim of
social organization.
5. Discipline or team playas
social attitqdes sought.
6. Duty or loyalty as personal
attitudes sought.
Individualistic Democratic Society
1. Happiness as dominant motive.
2. Basic right of individuals and
instrumental view of society.
3. Decentralization of government.
4. Opportunity for individual
enterprise and satisfaction as
aim of social organization.
5. Initiative or tolerance as social
attitudes sought.
6. Satisfaction or compromise
as personal attitudes sought.
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From Table V it can be seen that survival is the dynamic force
governing an authoritarian society, while satisfaction governs the
individualistic society. Actual societies are usually combinations of
these dynamics. Table V indicates extreme contrasts. Certain societies
however are essentially democratic and individualistic while others are
essentially authoritarian.
As a selective system a cultural pattern generates positive value
when the institutions in that society are culturally integrated and work
harmoniously with one other. Negative value arises in the disintegration
of culture when institutions conflict with one another. Culture acts to
select and create institutions~Jhjch canof~.oQ-t.·ton· under its social pressure,
and eliminates or transforms institutions in conflict with the harmonious
functioning of the culture as a whole.
Thus far, seven selective ~ystems based on the dynamics of purposive
acts and drives which maximize satisfaction and reduce pain, tension
or conflict have been examined~ The eighth and final selective system
which Pepper identified is that of natural selection.
Natural Selection
The goal of natural selection as a selective system is the preservation
of a species, in this case humankind in its environment. The means or
trials selected by the system are the individuals created for the process
or, in biological terms, the genetic variations formed by reproduction.
The environment selects and favors those individuals better adapted for
survival and disregards those less well adapted. Thus adaptability is the
-66-
positive value yielded by this selective system; non~adaptability or
maladaption is the negative value generated.
Pepper is quick to illustrate however that nat~ral selection in man
has more of an impact upon social structures than on individuals. Natural
selection has evolved or become converted into the concept of cultural
selection.28 In cultural selection, acquired characteristics or learnings
of that culture which have proved beneficial are passed on from one
generation to the next for the survival of a particular culture. Such
characterisitics are passed on by the process of acculturation. In this
way later generations cumulatively profit from the experience of older
29
ones. . In man1s domain, to the concept of survival of the fittest
individual has been added the concept of survival of the fittest society
acquired culturally. Pepper comments,:
The important thing for man is to be member of a society with
a cultural pattern of high survival value, one adapte~6·to its
phy~ical and particularly to its social environment.
Most crucial to recognize at this point is that selective systems one
through seven exhibited the dynamics of drives for the purpose of maximizing
satisfactions; the dynamics of natural selection exhibit drives for the
survival of the species. Two distinct dynamics of purposive drives should
then be acknowledged by the reader, those for satisfaction and those for
survival.
For the sake of additional clarity, the following paragraph and
concept map summarize and reiterate the developments occurring in this
chapter thus far. The world hypothesis which Pepper discovered and termed
selectivism has been described from its point of origin in the root metaphor
of the purposive act and operationally identified in eight selective systems.
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The conceptual and qualitative aspects of the purposive act have been
described, as have the qualitative values which arise from each of the
various selective systems. Schematically the concepts discussed in
this chapter to this point are illustrated in Figure VI.
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In providing evidence for the existence of the world hypothesis of
selectivism and the stru~ure of purposive behaviour, Pepper has described
various sytems which exist in, the world and exemplify the operational
characteristics of selectivism. He takes this exploration further,
however, in his theory of social adjustment.
Essentially in his social adjustment theory Pepper demonstrates that
selective activity exists in a hierarchial structure in the world. He
indicates that the selective ability of natural selection which is needed
for survival of the species is dominant overall the other selective systems.
The other selective systems are concerned with fullfilling the needs and
desires of humanity to maximize harmony, happiness, safety and security.
The remaining portions of this chapter provide the reader with an overview
of Pepper1s social adjustment theory and a brief summary of selectivism
as it has been explicated thus far.
Social Adjustment Theory
From the preceding review of selective systems and the values they
generate it can be demonstrated that, under certain conditions, one
system exerts control over another and some values may have greater
priority than others. Pepper provides an insight into the legislation
of one system over another byarranging them schematically in order of
their comprehensiveness. (See Figure VI)) 31
Dynamics of
Purposive
Drives
Open Society
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Selective
Systems
Cultural Pattern
(integrated vs. unintegrated)
- increase social pressure -
- decrease social pressure
Dynamics of
Natural
Selection
Functional
Society
Decentralized * Social Institutions Centralized
(conformity vs. nonconformity)
- increase social pressure -
- decrease social pressure -
Freedom
Initiative
Enjoyment
Pleasure
Social Situation
(congenial vs. uncongenial)
- increase social pressure -
- decrease social pressure -
Personality Structure
(integrated vs. unintegrated)
- increase social pressure -
~ decrease social pressure -
Personal Situation
(prudence vs. imprudence)
- increase social pressure -
- decrease social pressure -
Purposive Structure
(successful vs. unsuccessful)
- increase social pressure -
- decrease social pressure -
Security
Achievement
Success
*The level of Social Institutions has been added by this author because
at the time of the writing of Ethics, which this model is excerpted
from, social institutions was not considered a separate selective
system. Its discovery occurred later in Pepper 1 s Concept &Quality.
Note that for the purposes of this schematic the two types of purposive
structures, appetitive and aversive have been coalesced into one.
FIGURE VII: LINES OF LEGISLATION AMONG SELECTIVE SYSTEMS
AND INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETAL VALUES
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Recall that earlier it was mentioned that there are two distinct
dynamics of purposive drives, those which lie in the first seven selective
systems dealing with maximizing human satisfactions and those which
maximize survival of the species.
Pepper is indicating via this diagram that there is a bipolar action
between the dynamics of purposive drives and the dynamics of natural
selection. Both of these dynamics influence the values chosen by the
selective systems. The influence is largely the result of societal
pressure. By example, consider the selective system~ level of the social
institution. When life is harmonious for an institutions-there is little
pressure placed on individuals to conform to the norms of the institution.
Instead people are given a IIbit of slack ll and are not expected to conform
completely but are given more freedom from rules and regulations. If on
the other hand an institution is in trouble, suddenly its members are
required to sacrifice fredom and conform to the rules until the survival
of the institution is ensured.
This oscillating between individual satisfactions and values and the
survival of societal values represents the dynamics and ethical assumptions
inherent in Pepper's social adjustment theory~ The key to the dynamics
of the theory lies in ,the-fact that whenever the survival of the system
is threatened, individual needs are subjugated. That is to say that the
dynamics of natural selection dominate over the dynamics of purposive acts
when the survival of a group is at stake~ This implies that an
individual needs to develop strategies in life for maximizing his or her
happiness (for maximizing pleasures and minimizing pains). This happiness
can only be achieved if an indi vidual can keep societal pressures Br'f>tJ-m
-72-
survival at a distance. Individuals can accomplis~ this by keeping
themselves, society and the environment in a state of mutual accord with
one another.
People cannot be totally free of 'socteuy~:s.' pressures because
individuals inherently possess societal values through acculturation.
Human beings are both I'docile animals with basic drives and social animals
conveying an inheritance to the next generation. 1J32
By ~x'ercising social controll1owever, individuals and groups of
individuals can create social organizations that are well adapted to
their environment and are not in danger of becoming culturally extinct.
Since cultural survival is then not a concern, individuals living within
this particular social structure are freed of some of their obligations
to society and can securely and freely seek to maximize their own
happiness.
The two most common social organizations created by humans are the
authoritarian and democratic societies. The former stresses societal
rights over individual rights and is primarily concerned with the values
of human security in social organizations. Democratic societies give
greater attention to the needs of individuals in th~social organization.
The salient point is that often in both of these social organizations, the
needs of the individual and the needs of society are at odds with one
another.
For Pepper, the solution to such a conflict is the concept of an
adjustable social structure basedo~thadynamicsof selectivism. 33 Such
a society can be centralized in authority in a state of emergency and
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decentralized for individual satisfactions in times of peace.3~ In
selectivistic terms the needs of a social organization will initiate
whatever inherent selective dynamics are required to assist that
organization to survive. This is the premise for Pepperls Iisocial
adjustment theory.1I
Thus, it can be observed that selectivism based on the root metaphor
of purposive activity is operationally evident in a wide range of events
in the world. Evidence for its dynamics exist in individual human
behaviour as well as in the behaviour of human cultures. Selectivism
offers an interpretation about the nature of the dynamics of human systems.
SUr~MARY
This chapter has explored the development ofselectivism from its .
root metaphor to ·its· application as a world hypothesis capable of enriching
our understandi of human systems in the world. Selectivism has been
tentatively identified as a fifth world hypothesis arising from the root
metaphor of human purposive behaviour.
Two types of purposive acts have been discussed:. the appetitive and
the aversive. Both of these acts may be described qualitatively and
conceptually. They yield a structure comprised of a drive or fear impulse
with a split dynamics which controls and selects the correct acts or means
for attaining a desired end or goal. This attainment in turn reduces the
original drive or fear impulse.
Selectivism and the dynamics of the purposive act have been operationally
observed in a range of human selective systems which yield a variety of
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affective, conative-achievement and survival values. Finally, the
dynamic interplay b~tween individual and societal values have been
exemplified in Pepper1s social adjustment theory.
Further comments regarding the nature and identity of selectivism
as a world hypothesis are addressed briefly in chapter IV. Additionally
Chapter IV critiques the strengths and weaknesses of selectivism and suggests
a strong conceptual relationship between Pepper 1 s selectivism and the
systems philosophy of Ervin Laszlo.
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CHAPTER IV
SELECTIVISM AND SYSTEMS PHILOSOPHY
INTRODUCTION
Selectivism as a world hypothesis provides a method for interpreting
and perceiving events in the world in terms of the dynamics of human
systems. Individuals, groups, and societies all interact with each
other and all other events in the world relative to human needs and
desires. Interactions are purposive and the type of behaviour exhibited
during them is dependent upon the intrinsic needs of the individual or
individuals involved, i.e. behaviour may be appetitive or aversive.
Human needs and the dynamics initiated to attain and fulfill them
give rise to values, ethical assumptions, and judgements about what is
truthful and beautiful in the world. In this sense selectivism is a world
hypothesis similar to the other four in its provision of evidence for
what should be considered worthwhile events in the world. This is certainly
important for those involved with pursuing educational excellence. Further
discussion about educational excellence and selectivism can be found in
Chapter V.
This chapter begins by offering a brief critique of the nature and
identity of selectivism. This is followed by a discussion of the strengths
and weaknesses of selectivism and a comparison of selectivism and Laszlo·s
systems philosophy. The critique of the nature and identity of selectivism
is deliberately brief for two reasons. First a discussion of the nature
and identity of selectivism is beyond the scope of this thesis and is a
topic unto itself. Second, if selectivism as it exists can be shown to
contribute to the concept of educating and educational excellence, then
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extensively debating its actual identity is secondary to the intent of
this thesis.
SELECTIVISM - ITS NATURE AND IDENTITY - A CRITIQUE
There are two major questions which have concerned: scholars who have
examined Pepper1s selectivism: first, whether it is a hypothesis for
explaining the nature of the world, and second, whether selectivism is a
new and original world hypothesis. In addition, selectivism has also been
considered as a possible revision of one of the otheF world hypotheses or
synthesis of the other four world hypotheses. Pepper commented in his book
Concept and Quality that selectivism might possibly be a radical revision
of contextualism. l He was unaware when be began Concept and Quality what
he would discover about the nature and identity of selectivism and because
he was strongly contextualistic in his thinking, was no doubt overly
conscious of the similarities between some of the characteristics of
contextual ism and selectivism. This awareness, no doubt, prompted him to
comment about the nature of selectivism as a possible radical revision
of contextual ism.
In his analysis of the original four world hypotheses Pepper feels
that two of the hypotheses are slightly more adequate in their own right:
mechanism closely aligned with the physical sciences and contextual ism with
its stress upon the qualitative immediacy of the specious present. These
two theories account for a less IIforced ll account of the evidence of the
nature of the world than either formism or organicism. 2
For Pepper the world hypothesis with the potential for the greatest
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adequacy lies between mechanism and contextualism. 3 Selectivism appears
to be a synthesis using the conceptual determinateness common to mechanism
and qualitative feelings common to contextual ism.
Recall the qualitative/conceptual aspects and values of the purposive
structure. Such a synthesis,however, is not eclectic because the
characteristic has arisen directly from the root metaphor of the purposive
act and not from~ fusion of the qualities of mechanism and contextual ism.
The newness or uniqueness of such a hypothesis relates to the fact that it
is based on a new root metaphor, the purposive act. Thus world hypotheses
may possess similarities without being fused conglomerates. Fusion and
eclecticism imply an overlapping of world hypotheses in which their root
metaphors and categories are interwoven for no purpose other than to meld
the best of both theories together to see what results.
Eclecticism is short-term, peacemeal and lacks direction. Pepper
however is not eclectic. He has synthesized characteristics of
organicism, contextual ism and mechanism into the hypothesis selectivism
where they seem inherent in the structure of the system~ Organicism is
operationally evident in the social adjustment theory with .its emphasis
on the hierarchial integration of selective systems. Mechanism is evident
in the dynamics of purposive activ'ity with its emphasis on the interactions
between individuals and their environments. Contextual ism is evident in
the notion that purposive activity can be qualitatively felt/and described.
Additional evidence indicates that Pepper regards selectivism as an
interpretation of the world where aesthetic and qualitative feelings dominate
over the conceptual, scientific interepretation. This can be seen in his
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social adjustment theory, with its emphasis on the values and ethics
generated by selective systems to describe the nature of society and social
institutions. On the dominance of qualitative feelings Pepper asserts
that "felt qualities are the ultimate facts of the world."S
This emphasis on felt qualities has led many scholars to believe that
selectivism is really a deeper form of contextual ism. Monast feels that
Pepper has presented a theory which is contrary to modern scientific
and philosophical thought when he creates in selectivism a Ilfirm place
for feeling in the world, at the risk of denying a firm place to cognition. 1I6
Monast clearly feels that Pepper allows his contextualistic and aesthetic
leanings to prejudice the development of selectivism into what Monast
believes is a one sided aesthetic interpretation of the world. This
argument is short-sighted in this au,thors opinion, as Pepper deals with
means-end relationships as objects of cognition and, in so doing, does
not deny the cognitive perspective. Pepper is guilty perhaps of over-
emphasizing qualitative feelings, but not at the risk of denying cognitive
perspectives.
It is the contention of this author that indeed Pepper strongly
emphasizes the qualitative feeling aspects of selectivism in his application
of the world hypothesis as a provider of evidence about the world.
However this does not give rise to the conclusion that selectivism is a
more radical or deeper form of contextual ism, nor that this emphasis denies
the cognitive perspective.
This author feels that selectivism is a method for analyzing the
processes used to create life experiences requiring interpretation
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by world hypotheses. In seeking to increase and enrich the meaning of
events in the world it is necessary to interpret these events in some
way and to construct knowledge claims about them
Formism, mechanism, contextual ism, organicism and selectivism all
provide interpretations of the nature of events. But why do events need
to be interpreted and how do humans come to experience events in the world?
People need to interpret and comprehend events in order to give meaning
to their existence~ Without meaning life has no purpose. People
necessarily experience events because these events are the consequences
of actions which are subjected to the limitations and dynamics of
purposeful activity.
Selectivism explains purposive behaviour as the cause of human
experiences and events in the world. Such events may be the result of the
purposive behaviour of individuals, societies, social institutions or
cultures. For example, values are knowledge claims which possess emotional
meanings for people. As knowledge claims, values~re also alterable,
changing events in the world. Values according to selectivism are events
which arise out of the dynamics of human' purposive activity, i.e. the
value of success arises out of the consequences of attaining a desired
end or goal in a human appetitive purposive act. These values give
meaning to human events in the world. Selectivism interprets people1s
search for meaning as a constant quest for the good,thetrue, and the
beautiful because these are the actual qualitative events and values yielded
from the dynamics of human purposive activity.
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In enriching meaning for themselves, people can choose alternate
metaphors to assist in interpreting and collecting evidence about the
nature of events. Meaningful events should possess both IIfelt li and
lIintellectual li significance. Selectivism asserts that all events created
out of human purposive activity yield qualitative (felt) and conceptual
(intellectual) aspects. Furthermore, selectivism asserts that events
may be known and made meaningful by applying qualitative/conceptual modes
of interpretation to our experiences of them.
Selectivism as a world hypothesis is a method for understanding and
explaining the genesis and maintenance of truth, beauty, right and wrong,
etc. in terms of purposive experiences. Purposive behaviour gives birth
to events and experiences in the world and can also serve as a method for
interpreting them. In explaining the origins of experience resulting from
purposive behaviour, selectivism goes beyond the interpretive and
corroborative role of the other world hypotheses. In this sense, selectivism
is a more encompassing hypothesis about the nature of the world and thus,
potentially more adequate than the four other world hypotheses. However
in its interpretive role, selectivism shares a place on the continuum of
the other adequate world hypotheses. Additionally it exists outside the
interpretive realm as a process describing the origins of human
experiences.
Selectivism is both a cognitive process for understanding the origins
of life experiences and a method for qualitatively interpreting them.
Thus, selectivism is perhaps best regarded as possessing a dual identity
as a world hypothesis and as a process creating experiences that require
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interpretation by world hypotheses. Harrell in his work on the IISocial
basis of Root Metaphor ll appears to exhibit a similar belief about the
identity of selectivism, although he is convinced that selectivism arises
out of contextualism. 7
This author feels intuitively that Pepper equated the IInature of
the world" wi th the IIhuman nature of the world u • In other w().'rds PeptJer
felt that we as human beings can only perceive and construct reality in
terms of human behaviour and human values and ethics. For example
individuals can choose to construct reality based on common sense analogies.
Thus people can interpret events in terms of the root metaphors of formism,
mechanism, organicism, contextual ism or selectivism.
However root metaphors are events constructed out of purposive human
behaviour. i.e. the need to interpret the world in some fashion providing
the most meaning for an individual. This author believes that in
selectivism Pepper has provided a metaphysics which explains the origins
of the root metaphors of world hypotheses. Selectivism is perhaps best
regarded as the origin or the root metaphor of the root metaphor theory.
In conclusion selectivism is best regarded as possessing a dual
identity. Jt is a cognitive process for understanding the origins of human
experiences of the world and is also a method for interpreting them. The
discussion of the identity of selectivism ends at this point, for the
two reasons stated earlierin this chapter. First, the nature of such a
discussion is beyond the realm of this thesis and deserves much greater
attention from future analysis of Pepper1s metaphilosophy. Second, the
dual identity of selectivism as a world hypothesis and as a cognitive
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process explaining the derivation of life experiences is most crucial to
this thesis as it contributes to a further understanding of the
contributions of metaphilosophy to educating and educational excellence.
The contributions of selectivism to a theory of educating and educational
excellence are dealt with extensively in Chapter V.
Selectivism possesses strengths and weaknesses inherent in its dual
identity which are outlined in this current chapter. Also included in this
chapter is a comparison of the nature of selectivism as a world hypothesis
and the nature of systems philosophy proposed by Ervin Laszlo. It is
anticipated that such a comparison will demonstrate that selectivism and
systems philosophy are both world hypotheses dealing with purposive self-
regulating systems. Laszlo·s work is considered important by this author
in providing structural corroboration of Pepper·s metaphilosophy regarding
the synthetic and ordered nature of selective systems in the structure of
the world. Additionally Laszlo offers a perspective of systems philosophy
as a framework for an ontology, a philosophy of mind, an epistemology,
normative ethics, value and survival. These are highly similar to the
categories and characteristics yielded by Pepper1s selectivism.
Prior to comparing selectivism and systems philosophy however, some
comment is required regarding the strengths and weaknesses of selectivism.
Recall that for the purposes of this discussion, this author regards
selectivism as first a metahypothesis describing the process by which
human events and experiences come into existence in the world and second,
a world hypothesis for qualitatively/conceptually interpreting these same
events, and in so doing, enriching the meaning of these events for
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individuals experiencing them. Chapter V examines further the
contributions of selectivism to both the concepts of meaning and
educating.
SELECTIVISM - STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
Selectivism - Some Strengths of the Method
Several characteristics of~setectivism appear to make it a more
adequate world hypothesis than either formism, mechanism, contextual ism
and organicism - more adequate in the sense of possessing a broader scope
and greater precision in interpreting the evidence of the world. First,
selectivism stresses a view of the world which accounts not only for our
perceptions of events but also for our qualitative feelings concerning these
events; it possesses a dual qualitative/conceptual cognitive aspect. A
battle has long raged in ed~~ational circles and in the history of
cognition as to what constitutes the best method for obtaining knowledge
of the world. Is it via the empirical sciences with thetremphasis on
objective perceptions of the world or via personal awareness with its
emphasis on subjective qualitative experiences? Quantitative analysis
has longheld a position of greater prominence than qualitative analysis,
as a provider of evidence. This dualism, which exists between the arts
and sciences, arises from an inability to mediate the distinction between
qualitative and conceptual experiences of life.
Selectivism allows an individual to view an event IIfrom without",
or to view it from the perspective of IIliving ll it and describing the
feelings of living the event. The-Clu;~H'ltitative and the qualitative are
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given equal recognition, indeed are an inherent, and necessary, albeit
dualistic, aspect of selectivism. Purposive activity can yield qualitative
and conceptual reports referring to the same item of fact. Thus two
historical methods of obtaining and experiencing human knowledge meet in
selectivism.
This qualitative/conceptual aspect has vital implications for
selectivism as a framework for a theory of educating. Such a world
hypothesis for the provision of evidence for knowledge claims implies an
acceptance by educators of knowledge as that which may be experienced
both qualitatively and conceptually. Additudinal differences emphasizing
one method as superior to the other become obsolete arguments.
In the nature of its qualitative/conceptual duality selectivism as
a world hypothesis offers (~l a harmonious alternative to an historical
schism about the nature of knowledge which has plagued educators for
centuries and (2) a potentially broader basis on which facts in the world
may be corroborated. For example, one of the potential weaknesses of
mechanism is that, if adhered to in too rigid a fashion, meaning becomes
restricted to evidence which can be quantified. Selectivism stresses evidence
which may be described in both quantitative and qualitative terms.
Further to this argument, selectivism, because of its inherent
qualitative/conceputal aspect is potentially more appealing as a world
hypothesis to a greater number of people. As was mentioned in Chapter II,
it is a hypothesis which has appeal for artists, philosophers and
scientists alike. The synthetic nature of selectivism can provide a
common ground of understanding between various cognitive disciplines and
their adherents.
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Indeed the development of selectivism may represent the culmination
of a striving for harmony which began early in Pepper1s career. In the
preface to World Hypotheses Pepper expressed his concern about the methods
the logieal positivists used to get at the truth of human values.
Expressing his concern he states:
To think that this question could be met in the manner of a
puzzle and in terms of correlations, statistics, mathematics,
and language struck me as fantastic~Here w8s method running
away with issues, evidence and value itself.
Pepper1s sense of the qualitative was obviously offended by the approach
of the logical positivists. Many of his writings deal with aesthetics,
and his years at the University of California were spent as professor of
Philosophy and Aesthetics. Yet he was consumed with developing world
hypotheses as empirical methods and not dogmatic creeds, so he also
possessed a strong belief in the conceptual quantitative aspect of
cognition.
Selectivism to a large degree, as a synthesis of the qualitative
and conceptual aspects of experiences, may represent the final harmony
and solution of a conflict which has long lived in Pepper1s own mind.
This synthesis and duality may represent a great strength of the hypothesis
in the provision of harmony between differing cognitive disciplines;
conversely it may represent an inherent weakness. This will be discussed
in the next section of the chapter.
Summarizing the strengths of selectivism asa world hypothesis, this
author feels that the inherent conceptual/qualitative aspects of
selectivism provide (1) a synthetic world hypothesis capable of providing
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a cognitively broader and more generalized method of obtaining evidence
than any of the other four adequate world hypotheses, and as such will
contribute greatly to an understanding of educating as a quest for
evidence. In this provision selectivism also offers (2) a common ground
for harmonious understanding between practitioners of conflicting cognitive
and aesthetic disciplines - conflicts which have existed throughout the
history of human knowledge.
Thus far discussion has centered on the perceived strengths of
selectivism concerning its identity as a world hypothesis. However this
author feels that selectivism has an alternate identity, as a meta-
hypothesis for qualitatively and conceptually describing the process by
which experiences,and events come into existence in the world, laden with
their inherent values.
Such an identity lends selectivism an additional strength as it
relates to the knowledge realm. Here is an all encompassing hypothesis
attempting to explain the origins of the very events and experiences
individuals wish to extract meaning from. Selectivism asserts that events
in the world arise from the dynamics of purposive behaviour and that such
events may be known qualitatively and concep:tually. This characteristic
in selectivism provides a perspective for individuals wishing to analyze
how and why events and entities come into the world. Once in the world
such events are knowledge claims which may be interpreted by the methods
of formism, mechanism, contextual ism, organicism and selectivism.
The world hypotheses seek to interpret the evidence which has emerged.
Selectivism both interprets the evidence and offers an explanation
-89-
regarding its emergence in the world. Thus selectivism contributes to
a more in-depth analysis of an fndividual1sknowledge of events in the
world. Selectivism allows for an interpretation of an event or object
in terms of the evidence of what is beautiful, good, valuable and truthful
about the nature of an event, as well as how and why the event emerged
into the world.
Some scholars might argue that applying selectivisms· in-depth
analysis of purposive activity in tracing an event to its origin of
emergence is engaging in reductionism. However, analysis of purposive
activity is not reductionist, it is merely the mode of cognitive refinement
used in selectivism to provide a more comprehensive knowledge and thus
enrich the meaning of a total event for an indi vidual. In other~w~rrds.,
understanding the event as a whole is not lost in the analysis of how
the whole emerged.
In brief summary, selectivism as a metahypothesis explaining the
emergence of events in the world, most particularly the emergence of human
systems, provides a greater depth of evidence about the knowledge of the
world. Selectivism goes beyond being a world hypothesis for interpreting
the evidence of knowledge claims for criteria of excellence for that which
is beautiful, ethical, valuable and truthful; it provides a process or
method for obtaining evidence about the actual origin of the event or
object being judged to possess the criteria of excel1enc~.~:
Selectivism - Some Criticisms of the Method
One of the highlights of selectivism is its ability to interpret and
provide evidence of the nature and development of human systems based on
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the dynamics of purposive activity. Pepper unfortunately applies the
method almost solely to human systems. Purposive behaviour as a sample
of a process in nature is not shown to demonstrate interpretive adequacy
for occurrences in nature which are not the result of human purposive
activity. Thus the adequacy of selectivism to interpret facts outside of
human systems remains largely unanswered, indeed is not really attended
to in Pepper1s writings at all. In Concept and Quality, Pepper briefly
addresses the issue of other self-regulatory systems at work in inorganic
structures, but indicates that these "mechanisms do not meet the
requirements of a selective system and are purely mechanical systemsll~9
Nevertheless they are self-regulatory systems an~ according to Pepper it
would not be surprising if they yielded qualitative values. IO As will be
discussed later in this chapter, Laszlojs work on self-regulating systems
concentrates on a broader:~ spectrum- of the cosmic structure than does
Pepper1s selectivism.
In an apparent lack of interest in the breadth of application of
selectivism, Pepper virtually skims over and dismisses the subject earlier
in Concept and Quality by stating that purposive behaviour is the most
highly organized simple act which requires intelligence and any other
structures which might exist are simplifications of it ••• II we can learn
b t th b t f . I bt t . .. II P ha ou em y a sor 0 SImp esu rae 100.... epper was per aps
uncertain what these simpler structures were composed of or perhaps he
merely felt that it was not important to deal with occurrences in the
world which do not lie within the realm of human intelligent behaviour.
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He also addresses the existence of the problem in his earlier writings.
In Ethics, Pepper mentions the instinctive reflex acitivity of insects as
an example of a process differing from human purposive behaviour. l2 The
instinctive chain reflex arc is the opposite of an intelligent purposive
act. However an insect1s major mode of adjustment to its environment is
this instinctive reflex arc.
A reflex arc is a ~haih of acts catalyzed by a chemical hormone
initiating a particular chemical need, 'e.g. the need for food. When the
need is reduced after the final act in a series of chain reflexes there
is no longer any chemical stimulation to catalyze the first link in the
reflex, i.e. after eating an insect1s hunger reflex subsides. Chain
reflexes are physiologically and anatomically inherited and are not
learned behaviours. The sequence of chain reflexes is so rigid as to cause
repeated bl ind automat ic behav iour. Insti nctive: ref Iex arc behav iour
possesses no alternatives for obtaining needs.
Despite the fact that Pepper illuminates this difference between
reflex arcs and human purposive behaviour the issue remains whether under
voluntary or involuntary control both acts adapt an organicism to its
environment. Selectivism, in its concentration on purposive selective
behaviour in human systems, seems unable to account fully or empirically
for the survival of insect species engaging in non-purposive activity.
Therefore, as a world hypothesis, selectivism seems inadequate in
interpreting the evidence of events in nature not based on human purposive
behaviour. World hypotheses attempt to explain the world in its totality.
To exclude a significant number of events is thus to be less than a total
explanation.
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The following paragraphs deal with what this author feels is a
lack of flow or follow~hrough in Pepper1s development of a theory of
social adjustment from his discussion of purposive behaviour. Recall
that the eight selective systems identified by Pepper culminated in a
theory of social adjustment which stressed the concepts of self-
regulating and hierarchial integrations between levels of selective
systems. This world model of selectivism, with its emphasis on
integration, possesses the characteristics of organicism so much so that
this author is inclined to believe that it is a synthesis of some particulars
of organicism and selectivism.
Although the synthesis is understandable there is a sudden switch
in emphasis in the social adjustment theory from a concept of selective
activity to a concept of integration, wholeness and adaptability. This
change in emphasis provides a disorienting effect if an individual is
trying to trace the root metaphor of the purposive act and dynamic
selection through the hierarchy of selective systems. On reaching the
social adjustment theory the emphasis on selective activity is minimal
in comparison to the emphasis on the integrative activity or the lines
of legislation between selective systems.
It is felt by this author that the change in emphasis creates the
impression that the root metaphor of purposive selective activity has been
subjugated to an organistic concept in the social adjustment theory. The
concept of social adjustment has lost touch with the original root metaphor
of selectivism to adopt a more organistic outlook. Pepper does not talk
about legislation between systems as selective activity per se but argues
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hierarchial dominance between the values yielded by the systems. Pepper
may be presenting a mere change in emphasis which is slightly confusing
to the reader, trying to move from concepts of split dynamics to concepts
of integratedness. In changing his emphasis in this fashion Pepper is
likely synthesizing elements of organicism with selectivism, but does not
exemplify the synthesis adequately in terms of the root metaphor of
selectivism. Consequently he runs the risk of creating in the social
adjustment theory an autonomous abstraction which needs to be more clearly
identified with selectivism. Indeed, Pepper in World Hypotheses indicated
in the fourth maxim concerning root metaphors that Ilconcepts which have
lost contact with their root metaphors are empty abstractions."13 It
·:seems· he is in danger of violating his own maxirn.
The root metaphor of purposive activity is most certainly contained
in the social adjustment theory, but the organistic concepts of integration
and adaptability are emphasized more. Pepper speaks of the principle of
social pressure as •••
the key to the lines of priority among human values ••• thus the
ideal social structure for a society is thus revealed as an
adjustable one ready to centralize to whatever degree necessary
to meet an emergency, and ready to decentralize for the maximum
personal satisfaction of the individuT4 concsistent with
security when an emergency is over •••
The development of thought through the selective systems based on purposive
activity is given a less noticeable,roleinthe social adjustment theory;
this is somewhat disorienting. In the social adjustment theory the
emphasis of the root metaphor of purposive selective behaviour changes
from selective activity to an emphasis on the result of selectivity,
which is adaptation.
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Earlier in this chapter reference was made to the fact that
selectivism is esentially a synthesis of the qualitative and conceptual
aspects of experience. Such a synthesis may represent a great strength
of the hypothesis because it allows for the provision of harmony
between cognitive and aesthetic disciplines which have been narrowly
polarized and separated from one another by interpreting the world based
on only one of these aspects at the expense of the other.
Assume that Pepper was determined to find a solution to the problem
of whether experience truly possesses both qualitative and conceptual
aspects. The question that arises is, was he so determined that he
assumed a political middle-of-the-road approach to the issue and
consequently developed selectivism which gives equal recognition to the
qualitative and the conceptual? Only empirical support of the contention
that there is a qualitative/conceptual reality to all things will
eliminate the possibility that selectivism arose out of any sense of
political expediency.
Thus far this chapter has (I) critiqued the identity of selectivism,
and (2) commented on some strengths and weaknesses of selectivism, perceived
by this author. The following section is a comparison of the systems
philosophy of Ervin Laszlo and Pepper1s selectivism. It is the contention
of this thesis that systems philosophy expands the adequacy of selectivism
and structurally corroborates it as a world hypothesis and/or meta-
hypothesis which can provide a framework for educational excellence.
Systems Philosophy and Selectivism
Closely paralleling the selectivism of Stephen Pepper is the systems
philosophy of Ervin Lazlo. Both scholars developed their respective
philosophies independent of any knowledge of each others efforts. Pepper,
conducting a review of Laszlols book in the Journal of Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research comments:
••• my world hypothesis and Laszlo·s in his book under review
so closely resemble each other in principle that one might
think we had influenced each other. Actually they were
independently developed without either1gf us knowing what
the other was doing until very lately.
The remainder of this chapter articulates systems philosophy for the reader,
while expanding on the similarities and differences arising out of its
comparison with selectivism.
SYSTEMS PHILOSOPHY/SELECTIVISM - SIMILARITIES~¥>,
Systems Philosophy/Selectivism ..;. Derived from Similar Concerns
As was mentioned earlier in this Chapter, Pepper for many years of
his life was concerned with the apparent and persistent duality between
the conceptual and qualitative aspects of experience. Laszlo indicates
that he also is a philosopher concerned with this same duality, and with
finding solutions to the questions of life,solutions possessing scope and
precision. He comments:
••• I was struck by the tremendous refinement of the answers
proposed by great philosophers, and the equally tremendous
wealth of information offered by great scientists. However,
I was still not getting satisfactory answers to my questions,
because the philosophical answers lacked an adequate factual
basis, and the scientific answers tended to be either
restrictive 0f6naively generalizing from the viewpoint of a
speciality •.•
Laszlo, like Pepper, discovered Whitehead~s application of scientific data
to philosophical synthesis. Laszlo comments:
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••• there must be someone on the contemporary scene who is
capable of combining philosophic astuteness, with scientific
informedness17 I thought; and eventually I came acrossWhitehead •••
Both Pepper and Laszlo embarked on quests for a synthetic hypothesis,
which in providing scope and precision about the nature of the world
would reveal the reality of human experience to be both qualitative and
conceptual and which would provide a point of connection for science and
philosophy. A further comparison of selectivism and systems philosophy
shows both hypotheses to be structurally self-regulating systems.
Systems Philosophy/Selectivism ~ Self-Regulating Systems
Laszlo, in systems philosophy, synthesizes a general theory of the
world using known data from the empirical sciencesu Adhering to the
cybernetic age of thinking, he creates an all encompassing model of the
relationships between the "dynamic systems which exist at different levels
of organization in nature. These dynamic systems are the reconceptualized
thoughts of the specialized sciences, i.e. chemical, biological and
ecological phenomena are currently construed as systems. IS Human beings
are situated within a set of systems which are unclearly interrelated to
one another, i.e. how are ecological and political systems interrelated?
Laszlo felt there was a need for a general theory of systems to explain
the interrelatedness of different systems phenomena.
For Laszlo, a model of the structure of the cosmos in cybernetic
terms possesses levels of dynamic systems on two different planes, which
he terms the microhierarchy and the macrohierarchy. He further defines
these hierarchies as terrestrial and astronomical. The macrohierarchy is
comprised of all astronomical entities such as galaxies, star clusters,
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stars, planets, atoms, molecules, molecular compounds, etc. The micro-
hierarchy is comprised of all known terresttial entities such as atoms,
molecules, compounds, organisms, social and ecological systems. The
macro-and microhierarchies intersect one another at the level of the atom.
General systems theory, is concerned primarily with the micro-
hierarchy from the level of the atom to the level of a world system. The
microhierarchy is structured such that the lowest level is comprised of
atoms, which evolve into the next highest level of system which is
molecules. The levels of organization of systems increases vertically
and consecutively through crystals and colloids, cells, protoorganisms,
organisms, socia and ecosytems and finally to world systems. 20
Each level of system relates to the total hierarchy of cosmic
structure in two ways: intrasystemically and intersystemically, or
vertically and horizontally. In intrasystemic relations, one level of
natural system incorporates systems above and below it in the cosmic
hierarchy. In intersystemic relations each type of system reacts and
interrelates with other systems in its environment, in the same level of
the cosmic hierarchy.
In his theory of general systems Laszlo articulates some invariant
properties which are common to each level of system in the micro/macro
hierarchy.21 The characteristics common to all natural systems are:
(1) a systemic state property - which refers to the fact that all systems
possess ordered wholeness, (2) a system cybernetics - which implies all
systems consist of the adaptive techniques of self-stabilization and
and self-organization, and (3) a system holan-property - which relates to
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the tendency of each system to have intra and inter-systemic relationshi.ps,
which increase the hierarchial structure of the cosmic whole.
It is the property of system cybernetics, with its adaptive techniques
of self-stabilization an¢ self-organization, which parallels the split
dynamics of appetitive and aversive acts in selectivism. Both may be
categorized as self-regulatory systems.
Recall that in selectivism the split dynamics of the drive o-per'a-t-ionalizes
both the ends and the means of obtaining that end in an act of purposive
behaviour. If a wrong means is chosen, the individual learns the error and
does not repeat it under the same or similar circumstances. The incorrect
means is discarded from the individual1s cognItive makeup. Purposive
behaviour is regulated by its own selective dynamic so that an individual
or organism may adapt to its environment.
In systems philosophy a system maintains a steady state by a
constant interplay of the forces acting inand~n the system. Adaptation
through stabilization may be seen when a system compensates for any changes
in its environment by co~ordinating or regulating changes in the system1s
internal variables. 23 The other self-regulating dynamic involves
adaptation through self-organization and evolution. If an organized whole
or system encounters external forces which repeatedly act upon parts of its
system, which are fixed or stationary parts normally used to stabilize the
system, then the ordered whole must reorganize its parts to adjust or
adapt to the fixed and constant external foree, rr it is to survive. 24
When acted upon by external forces, self-organization moves a system into
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a progressively more organized system, while self-stabilization maintains
the system in its pre-existing state of organization, depending on which
dynamic is required for adaptation and survival.
Note how similar the self-regulating behaviour of the cybernetic
system is to the social adjustment theory of selectivism in which an
individual adapts to social environmental pressure by either altering his
or her behaviour to conform to societies wishes when the pressure is great.
When the pressure is lessened the individual alters his or her behaviour
to seek personal needs and desires.
It is important to notice that the self-regulation which governs
systems and individuals, responds to different dimmensions of external
forces in systems philosophy and selectivism. In systems cybernetics,
a dynamic of self-organization occurs in response to the duration of an
external force, or in Laszlols terms, an external force which is a fixed
constant. In selectivism the parallel self-regulating dynamics of the
various levels of selective systems respond to the amount or quantity
of external social pressure applied to the system.
Pepper does not comment in his self-regulatory social adjustment
theory about the duration of social pressure; nor does Laszlo comment in
his dynamics of sel f-organization .. on the amount of pressure appl ied by
external physical constants. This author feels that the dimensions of
both duration and intensity comprise external environmental forces,
and that cybernetic and selective systems will respond in the same
fashion to either a quantitatively large external pressure or a constant
and enduring pressure.
-100-
The omission of one or the other of these dimensions of external
pressure by both Pepper and Laszlo may indicate that each scholar assumes
the inclusion of the other dimension, or omits it unconsciously as a
result of their personal perspective. The result however. is that,
according to Pepper and Laszlo, system cybernetics asa self-regulating
system re~organizes itself to adapt to an external pressure of constant
duration. This is different from the quantity or increase in social
pressure stimulating an adaptive response from the dynamics of selectivism
as a self-regulating system operating in the social adjustment theory.
In summary, both selectivism and systems philosophy are structurally
similar in so far as they exhibit self-regulating dynamics. The third
point of similarity which should be commented on briefly, is that both
selectivism and systems philosophy are conceptualized as hierarchial
structures.
Systems Philosophy/Selectivism - Hierarchial Structures
Systems philosophy, as was mentioned, is conceptualized by Laszlo
in a hierarchial structure comprised of two major levels: the macro-
hierarchy and the microhierarchy. Each level of system in the world
structure increases in degree of organization from the lowest level of
lIenergy condensations" to the IImetagalaxyll. Each level is comprised of
the levels below it and the level above which incorporates it. The
schematics in Figure VIII and Figure IX present the reader with a visual
comparison of the hierarchies suggested by systems philosophy and
selectivism.
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-102-
Dynamics of Dynamics of
Purposive Selective Evolutionary
Drives Systems Process
Open Society Cultural Functional
Pattern Society
Decentralization Social Centralized
Institution
Freedom Social Security
Situation
Initiative Personality Discipline
Structure
Enjoyment Personal Achievement
Situation
Pleasure Purposive Success
Structure
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While both systems philosophy and selectivism are conceptualized
as being hierarchial structures by Laszlo and Pepper there are
differences between the two as to the nature of relationships between
the levels within each system. These are discussed later in this
chapter. A fourth similarity between selectivism and systems philosophy
is that each possesses a flavour of organicism, contextual ism and mechanism,
synthesized in the concept of self-regulation.
Systems Philosophy/Selectivism - Self-Regulatory Synthesi?ofOrgani~ism
Contextual ism and Mechanism
Recall that mechanism may be thought of as a way of looking at the
world from the perspective of how things cause, link with, influence or
correlate with other things. 27 Laszlo and Pepper each indicate correlations
between the levels of systems in the respective hierarchies of systems
philosophy and selectivism. Let1s look briefly at this.
Systems philosophy provides a mechanistic notion of intrasystemic
and intersystemic dynamics, while selectivism emphasizes the lines of
legislation between systems. In selectivism this is visible in the dynamics
of the social adjustment theory. Thus the cause and effect nature of
the interplay between systems adapting to their environments is mechanistic
and exists in both systems philosophy and selectivism.
Contextualistic threads are visible in Pepper1s social adjustment
theory. Contextual ism sees a world of constant change, and events are
qualitatively felt and understood as the changing present. The
circumstances of an event dictate the qualitative vividness of the event,
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and these circumstances are constantly changing. The ethical decisions
arising out of the dynamics of social situations are decisions based
only on the circumstances and social pressures of a particular situation
at a particular moment demanding the priority of certain values.
The changing present event also provides the parameters for the
existence-directed, self-regulating beh~j'our of systems in the macro -
microhierarchies, and the qualitative impact of change on the hierarchy
as a whole may be intuited. Each adaptive and self-regulatory action
taken by a system is unique to the nature of the intra and intersystemic
relationships of that system at a particular specious moment. Thus
contextual ism is seen to be present and synthesized into the concepts of
both selectivism and systems philosophy.
An organistic outlook implies a perspective based on the concept of
integration. Organicism is most evident in both systems philosophy and
selectivisms l social adjustment theory in each theory1s respective treatment
of IIwholeness ll • In organicism, wholeness is measured by the degree to
which facts are interrelated and dependent upon one another. If one fact
is altered or every other fact in the system alters or the
system is destroyed. Clearly an organistic perspective has been
synthesized into the structural dynamics of the self-regulatory mechanisms
of both Laszlo·s systems philosophy and Pepper1s selectivism.
The social adjustment theory interprets a holistic world structure
dependent on, and comprised of, eight selective systems ranging from
the level of purposive behaviour to the level of cultural selection and
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survival. Systems philosophy extends a picture of a cosmic whole of
hierarchially integrated systems ranging from the level of fundamental
energy condensations to the metagalaxy and comprising both the terrestrial
and astronomical universes. In both conceptualizations changes in one
level affect the nature of other levels and the hierarchial whole.
In brief summary, certain characteristics of organicism, contextual ism
and mechanism appear to this author to be synthesized into the self-
regulating dynamic structures of both selectivism and systems philosophy.
The fifth and final similarity betweenselectivism and systems philosophy
which this thesis will address is concerned with the fact that both may
be considered as interpretive world hypotheses, and as processes explaining
the origins of events in the world.
Systems Philosophy/Selectivis~~ Interpretive World Hypotheses - Descriptors
of the Origin of Life Events
Earlier in this chapter, selectivism was described as a world hypo-
thesis capable of qualitatively/conceptually interpreting and describing
the origins of knowledge about human systems in the world. Selectivism
accomplishes this by explaining the derivation of human systems from the
point of view of intelligent self-regulatory purposive behaviour. Systems
philosophy also offers a world view oi perspective of the structure of
the universe based on the analogy of a dynamic self-regulating system.
Thus, both selectivism and systems philosophy are world hypotheses. Pepper
in a review of Laszlo·s work describes systems philosophy as lI a world
hypothesis thoroughly empirical without any dependence on items of self
evidence or idubitability ••• its paradigm or root metaphor is system or
more specifically the dynamic self-regulating system. 1I29
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Systems ph i losophy, like se IectlvJ.sm, may aIso be cons idered a
process for understanding the origin and derivation of life events, of
things to be experienced. Selectivism explains the origin of experiences
as the consequences of selective actions operating at different levels
of purposive goal seeking behaviour. Systems philosophy explains the
origins of life experiences as consequences of the adaptive behaviour of
systems. The point here is merely that both selectivism and systems
philosophy offer a similar explanatory process for investigating the
origins of encountered experiences~., and for interpreting the nature of
these experiences. Now that we have considered some similarities between
selectivism and systems philosophy~ let1s turn to some important differences.
SYSTEMS PHILOSOPHY/5ELECTIVISM - DIFFERENCES
Systems Philosophy andSelectivism - An Emphasis on Adapted States vs.
An Emphasis on Selective Activity of Drives or Impulses
The emphasis in systems philosophy is one in which maximum value for
a system, or for persons as systems, is optimum adaptation to the
environment. Continued existence is the basic goal of all systems through
adaptation in an appropriate state of organization. 30
Selectivism also stresses adaptation or the decreasing of tensions
between conflicting needs of different systems. This is visible in the
dynamics of the social adjustment theory. However, while adaptation
is the final goal to be attained, selectivism is a world hypothesis which
emphasizes the concept of a drive or an impulse urginga system to begin
self-regulatory behaviour. The drive and its selective activity are
noticeably more emphasized in Pepper1s concept of an adjusting adapting
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system than cybernetic feedback is in Laszlo·s concept of adaptation.
Selectivism offers an interpretation of adaptive behaviour which
emphasizes the process of self-regulation through the dynamics of selective
drives necessary to achieve an adapted state which is required for
survival~ Systems philosophy acknowledges a process of self-regulation
through cybernetic feedback but the major emphasis of this philosophy is
the provision and interpretation of a concept of adaptation.
In systems philosophy, adaptation as a precondition for existence
of all living systems is the pivotal and salient point. The cybernetic
self-regulatory process for achieving adaptation is recognized but is a
less conspicuous characteristic of systems philosophy than the final
adapted systemic state.
The difference is subtle. However, it appears to reflect a more
process or method oriented approach in Pepper1 s thinking and a more
product oriented approach in Laszlo1s thinking. Both scholars believe
in the primary and fundamental value of adaptation, but Pepper attends
to the self-regulatory means for achieving adaptation to a greater
extent than Laszlo. The pivotal interest of Laszlo is in the paramount
nature of adaptation. This is evident in his book on systems philosophy
in a chapter on IIA New Age Ethos ll • Laszlo·s concern is recognized by
Pepper:
••• the value norm of adaptation stands over man and his
social systems and must be treated with res~ect - and even
in Laszlo·s favored term with IIreverencell.j
Pepper begins with a selective process which culminates in a theory
-108-
of social adjustment and. ultimate adaptation. Laszlo begins with
adaptation as the ultimate value and explains the dynamics of systems
to attain it in cybernetic terms.
A further comparison of selectivism and systems philosophy yields
a difference on the part of Pepper and Laszlo in the extent to which
they respectively apply their world hypotheses to the range of the
cosmic structure~ Let1s briefly examine how well these world hypotheses
account for the total evidence about the nature of the world. Clearly
selectivism emphasizes a self-regulatory process for the adaptation and
survival of humans and human systems. Systems philosophy based on a
cybernetic self-regulatory process is shown to be operable in any level
existing in the cosmic structure from atoms to constellations, including
human systems.
In choosing the root metaphor of purposive behaviour, Pepper limits
and restricts the scope of selectivism to primarily interpreting the
adaptive values of intelligent (primarily human) organisims. The
application of purposive behaviour to atoms and molecules remains
largely unaddressed by Pepper. Purposive behaviour is perhaps best
thought of as a type of self~regulatory mechanism; but essentially it
is the cybernetic theory of self~regulation which provides scope to
systems philosophy to interpret both human and nonhuman systems.
The cybernetic theory of feedback which accounts for the maintenance
of homeostasis and evolution of the organization of a system for the
purpose of adaptation encompasses human purposive behaviour. Purposive
behaviour isonemethod of self-regulatory behaviour yielding values of
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satisfaction as well as survival for the human species. While
selectivism provides a framework for ethical living for systems of
people, Laszlo·s philosophy, based on the root metaphor of systems -
spec if ica lly se If - regu Iat ing systems, aIso prav ides a<.f.r-amework
for all natural systems (human and non-human) based on the prime value
of adaptation which is necessary for the existence of all things. It is
this author·s contention that Laszlo fills in the gap between human and
non-human systems. Essentially he accomplishes this by equating the
self-regulating homeostatic behaviour of biological and physical systems
with the purposive self-regulatory behaviour of human systems. He terms
this conceptual bridge, systems behaviour, or general systems theory,
based on a root metaphor of cybernetic self-regulation for the prime
value of adaptation and continued existence.
The difference between Laszlo's and Pepper's perspectives is one of
emphasis and not of insight. Both perceive a connection between self-
regulatory behaviour and survival or adaptation. Pepper in his selectivism,
however, humanizes self-regulatory behaviour to develop the concept of
purposive behaviour. Perhaps this reflects Pepper1s concern for creating
a world hypothesis capable of providing a framework for harmonious living.
Such humanism should be applauded, but is empirically impure. This
author believes that Pepper accomplished a framework for a normative
ethics at the risk of losing'sortle' of the scope and adequ'aCyof selecti vism.
This was caused by choosing to emphasize human purposive behaviour instead
of self-regulating behaviour.
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Pepper was conscious of his bias towards hunlanism when he chose the
root metaphor of purposive behaviour.. He was intent on finding a method
for interpreting human experience qualitatively and conceptually. It
is questionable as to whether he was ever really seeking a qualitative/
conceptual interpretation of the nature of the world or merely an
interpretation of human experiences of the world. Evidence seems to
confirm the latter. In defending his choice of the root metaphor of the
purposive act early in Concept and Quality, Pepper dwells on the benefits
of purposive behaviour as something which m·ay be known consciously and
felt qualitatively in human experience. 32 He implies that we may only
know the world in terms of our human experiences of it. Consequently
the meaning of these experiences may be known emotionally and intellectually.
Laszlo1s metaphilosophy interprets all systems in the world rather
than just specifically interpreting human systems. Laszlo, like Pepper,
was very conscious of the reasons for choosing his root metaphor of
general systems self-regulation. It was an attempt to offer an inter-
pretation of the structure of the entire universe of systems, not merely
the world of human systems. He states:
••• The most consistent as well as most general paradigm
available today to the inquiring, ordering mind is the
systems paradigm ••• For within this framework the anthropormorphic
bias of commonsense experience is neutralized: the systems
philosophical paradigm takes man as one species of concrete
and actual system, embedded in encompassing natural hierarchies
of likewise con§3ete and actual physical, biological, and
social systems.
Thus, Laszlo1s systems philosophy and Pepper1s selectivism both provide
insight into the importance of self-regulating behaviour as a requisite
for survival and adaptation of systems. However, selectivism emphasizes
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the self-regulatory dynamics of human purposive behaviour while systems
philosophy emphasizes the self-regulatory behaviour of all natural
systems (human and non-human).
Much more could be said regarding the nature of this difference
between selectivism and systems philosophy, but it is beyond the scope
of this thesis, and is a topic unto itself. The difference is acknowledged
by this author to indicate that systems philosophy may have contributions
to make to the scope of selectivism as a world hypothesis.
Summarizing briefly, a comparison of systems philosophy and
selectivism yields the following major similarities. First they arise
out of a similar concern in theminds of both Laszlo and Pepper. Second,
each is structurally a self-regulating system. Third, each is based on
a hierarchial concept. Fourth, each possesses a flavor of organicism,
contextual ism and mechanism synthesized intheconcept of self-regulation.
Fifth, each may be considered an interpretive world hypothesis, and~ in
addition both are processes explaining the origins of events in the world.
Selectivism and systems philosophy differ" in the following ways.
First, selectivism emphasizes the selective dynamic which yields an adapted
organism, while systems philosophy emphasizes adaptation via cybernetic
feedback. Selectivism is more process oriented while systems philosophy
is more product oriented. Second, systems philosophy as it is presented
by Laszlo is shown to be operational over a wider scope of the cosmic
structure than selectivism. For example, as was mentioned earlier in this
chapter, selectivism is assumed to be operating at atomic levels,
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although its structural dynamics are considered to be more mechanistic
than selective. Systems philosophy is demonstrated as inherent and
operable at the atonlic level as well as at the social systems level.
Thus far, this chapter has offered (1) a brief critique of the
identity of selectivism, (2) commented on some strengths and weaknesses
of selectivism and (3) made a comparison of selectivism and systems
philosophy with respect to similarities and differences existing between
the two. The final portion of this chapter comments on the contributions
of systems philosophy to selectivism and on the nature of selectivism as
a world hypothesis capable of providing a framework for educational
excellence.
Some Contributions of Systems Philosophy to Selectivism
The foregoing comparative discussion of systems philosophy and
se1ectivism was engaged in for the purpose of suggesting that systems
philosophy has some contributions to make to the concept of selectivism.
It is the contention of this thesis that systems philosophy contributes
to selectivism in two ways. First, it provides a broader scope for the
adequacy of selectivism as a world hypothesis by emphasizing the self-
regulatory aspect of the root metaphor of purposive behaviour. Second,
it offers structural corroboration of selectivism as a world hypothesis.
Through emphasirzlrig the self-regulatory dynamics comm'on to all
natural systems versus the purposive self-regulatory behaviour of human
systems, systems philosophy does not dispel selectivism, but rather
expands the adequacy of the world hypothesis as an interpretive tool.
Systems philosophy offers selectivism a way of beoming more applicable
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to non~human realities by placing a less anthropomorphic emphasis on
the root metaphor of self-regulatory adaptive behaviour.
The major similarity between systems philosophy and selectivism is
the fact that both deal partially or entirely with some form of self-
regulatory behaviour of systems, human and/or otherwise. Although this
root metaphor is emphasized from differing perspectives, nevertheless
it is an identical root metaphor in principle in both systems philosophy
and selectivism.
The central point of both selectivism and systems philosophy is the
concept of self-regulatory adaptive behaviour. Systems philosophy
provides general evidence for this point. Selectivism providesevi~ence
for this same central point, although largely from the realm of human
behaviour. In this sense systems philosophy and selectivism are parallel
world hypotheses, structurally corroborating the root metaphor of a
dynamic self-regulating system which provides a synthetic interpretation
of the structure of the world.
It is the contention of this author that both selectivism and systems
philosophy are synthetic interpretations of the world. This is a major
reason for the appeal of these world hypotheses and of synthetic meta~
phil~sGphyingeneral, as a framework for educational excellence. The
greatest contribution of selectivism and systems philosophy to a concept
of educational excellence is their synthetic nature. Pepper and Laszlo
were each concerned with the conceptual relationships between knowledge
fields and their respective hypotheses of selectivism and systems
philosophy. Earlier in this chapter the qualitative/conceptual synthesis
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of Pepper1s selectivism was discussed as offering a harmonious inter-
face between science and philosophy. Laszlo expresses similar
anticipations about the contribution of his systems philosophy to the
field of knowledge •
••• there is ample opportunity within its conceptual framework
for collaborative work by empirical scientists and
philosophers of the most diverse interests. By sharing a
common general framework, theories advanced by investigators
on diverse fields can become mutually relevant and fertile~
Thus the prese~~ communications gap in the disciplines may
be overcome •••
This author feels that the validity of selectivism as a metaphilosophy
providing a framework for eductional excellence will be largely determined
by the appeal of its synthetic principles. This will be further explored
in the next chapter.
SUMMARY
Chapter IV has been an attempt to explicate the following: (1) the
identity of selectivism as a world hypothesis; (2) the strengths and
weaknesses of selectivism in light of its identity; (3) the similarities
and differences between the two independ~ntly developed but parallel
world hypotheses of selectivism and systems philosophy; and (4) the
contributions and structural corroboration that systems philosophy offers
to the interpretive scope of selectivism. Figure X is a schematic
summarizing and connecting the concepts discussed in this chapter. Chapter
V addresses the contribution of selectivism to a theory of educational
excellence and a concept of educating involving teaching, learning,
curriculum and governance.
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CHAPTER V
SELECTIVISM AS A BASIS FOR EDUCATIONAL EXCELLENCE
INTRODUCTION
A theory of educating, regardless of the propositions it may put
forth~ is always derived from philosophical tenets. In Western society
these tenets are concerned primarily with the provision, maintenance
and evolution of knowledge for use by future generations~ Only that
knowledge which is judged to be excellent ought to be incorporated into
the curriculum of educational institutions for preservation and
dissemination. A knowledge claim is judged to be excellent if it provides
an individual with an insight or interpretation about the truth, the good
and the bad of things in life, and the value of things which enrich the
human experiences of life.
The purpose of preserving knowledge claims which meet the criteria
of excellence, and of educating future generations about such knowledge,
is to ensure cultural survival. Indeed, Pepper would argue that in the
human race, cultural and biological survival are inseparable in the
evolutionary process if the species is to survive. Such knowledge as has
helped one generation to exist must be passed on to the next generation.
In addition to providing and maintaining knowledge claims which
have been judged to be excellent, educating is also involved in the
provision of evidence for t~ese same knowledge claims. Such a provision
of evidence enriches the me~ing of a learning experience for an
individual. This was discussed in Chapter II of this thesis.
Educators have historically argued and renlained divjded over the
issue of what constitutes the best method for obtaining evidence about
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knowledge claims, and for interpreting them. A duality exists,
consequently, be~ween qual,itative and quantitative methods, between
artists and the empirircal scientists. Knowledge fields have become
highly specialized, not only in subject matter, but in the method used
to interpret that subject matter.
Thus for example, the study of art is taught primarily from a
qualitative perspective and meaning is largely qualitatively experienced
by those persons interpreting artistic knowledge in the world. The
physical sciences are taught from a quantitative perspective and the
evidence for knowledgeclainls is obtained primarily via an interpretation
of empirical facts. The schism has become so great over time that educators
and curricula are polarized and uncompromising regarding quali~ative/
quantitative knowledge. It 'appears to be an either/or situation. Knowledge
may be interpreted qualitatively or quantitatively.
Thus far,this chapter has briefly presented the reader with some
bas ic tenets of a theory of educat i ng wh ich 'seem to th is author to be
common in Western society~ Reiterating, they are: (1) educating is
involved with the provision, maintenance and evolution of knowledge in
order that such knowledge be given to future generations, (2) the provision
of knowledge for future generations is for the purpose of ensuring
cultural and biological survival, (3) only that knowledge which has been
jUdged to be excellent should be passed on, (4) knowledge claims, as well as
the evidence for knowledge claims, should be taught in nrder to further enrich
the meaning of an individual1s learning experience, and (5) knowledge claims
and evidence for the validity of knowledge claims are thought to.be
capable of interpretation by either qualitative or conceptual methods.
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The application of these tenets is accomplished through an educative
process in schools, which comprises four dynamically interacting elements:
the teacher, the learner, the curriculum, and the administration governing
the process. Recall that these are the commonplaces of the educative
event denoted by Gowin whose work was cited in Chapter II of this
thesis in~'relation to Pepper1s world hypotheses. This current chapter is
intended to express the contribution which this author feels that
selectivism as a metaphilosophy can make to a theory of educating.
Selectivism will be shown to contribute to a theory of educating
primarily as a result of its synthetic principles. The inherent qualitative/
conceptual identity of selectivism provides an epistemology which
contributes to a revisioning of what it isthat constitutes educational
excellence. Selectivism is anepistemolJ)§Y that provides us with knowledge
about the nature of knowledge. Selectivism supports the concept that as
human beings we can find intellectual and emotional meaning in our
experiences of events in the world. The discussion which follows outlines
the conceptual relationships between selectivism and a theory of educating
and demonstrates the contributions of selectivism to educational excellence.
SELECTIVISM AS A BASIS FOR EDUCATIONAL EXCELLENCE
Reiterating briefly, educating is a process which accounts for the
provision, maintenance and evolution of knowledge claims. Such knowledge
claims are extended to individuals to expand and enrich their understanding
of the world. Knowledge claims are considered excellent enough to extend
to others if such claims possess intellectual and emotional meaning which
in turn adds purpose to people1s lives.
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It is important to remember that knowledge claims are an individual l $,
constructions of reality. When individuals share reality constructions
with others, knowledge becomes a social event. Educating is the name
applied to this process of sharing constructions of reality. This
sharing represents a mutual human effort to enrich and give meaning to
human existence. When shared meaning occurs between individuals an
educative event has occurred. Educational excellence is achieved when
shared meaning occurs between people and the 'meaning which is grasped in
the event is enriching to their individual and/or collective lives.
In Western society, knowledge claims or constructions of reality are
considered to be enriching and meaningful if they: (1) can be shown to be
true, actual constructions of reality; (2) can enrich our qualitative/
aesthetic experience of the world because they possess criteria6f
beauty and artistic merit; (3) can enrich our conceptions of etbical
judgements needed for communal living; and (4) enrich our concepts of
what is valuable and worthwhile in the world.
Thus, an educative event may be considered excellent if shared
meaning between individuals occurs and the knowledge constructions which
are shared possess ·acceptable criteria of enrichment and excellence.
Judging knowledge claims to be excellent requires that individuals acquire
evidence about the nature of the claim. Therefore educators must be
providers of both knowledge claims and the evidence for the excellence or
lack of excellence of knowledge claims.
Additionally the meaning of a knowledge claim can be further enriched
for an individual if that person is able to speculate about, or obtain
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information about, how the particular knowledge claim came into existence
as an event in the world. Individuals should be able to acquire knowledge
about the nature of knowledge. Also an individual should become aware
of the way he or she tends to grasp the meanings of knowledge claims.
In other words, individuals should be cognizant of how they learn.
Thus the pursuit of educational excellence involves; (1) providing
students with knowledge claims which are meaningful and enriching because
they possess accepted criteria of excellence; (2) providing students with
evidence about the excellence of the knowledge claims that are taught to
them; (3) assisting students to a-cffutre knowledge about the nature of
knowledge; and (4) assisting students to comprehend how they as individuals
uniquely acquire meaning from the events they experience in the world.
Selectivism is an epistemology and a cognitive method which this author
feels can provide a basis for the pursuit of educational excellence and
enrich our understanding of educational theory. Selectivism can accomplish
this by providing a conceptual framework on which to base educational
excellence. Let1s examine the ways in which selectivism provides this
conceptual framework.
Selectivism and the Provision of Knowledge
Let us assume that knowledge is the outcome of persistent human attempts
to lend meaning to human experience. As such the acquirement'of meaningful
knowledge adds a sense of purpose to our lives. The salient point to
recognize is that we can only experience the world using human ways and
means. The only experience of the world which we can have or share is the
human experience of it. This may appear to be a rather obvious statement
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but it is in this author1s opinion the foundation upon which selectivism
is grounded.
Selectivism offers us a method for perceiving knovl/ledge events in
the world as the consequences of purposive human behaviour. The criteria
of excellence embedded in knowledge claims inherently arise out of the
dynamics of human purposive activity. Selectivism implies that for human
beings the world may best be known in terms of the human experiences of
it. All meanings and criteria of excellence that exist in knowledge claims
are actually changing human constructions of reality. Therefore the
best way to understand knowledge is to view it as a shifting consequence
of human living and purposive activity.
This concept of providing and perceiving knowledge has several
implications for the achievement of excellence in an educative event.
First, teachers must grasp the concept of knowledge claims as shifting or
alterable human constructions of reality to be shared. Second,t,eachers
can never cease in the pursuit of acquiring new or altered knowledge
claims to share with a student if they accept the tenet that knowledge
claims are dynamic events in the world arising out of human purposive
activity. An excellent teacher understands and disseminates knowledge
claims as alterable human constructions which approximate reality and
provide meaning to individuals.
Teachers must be constant learners if they are to be adequate providers
of knowledge claims. Expertise in any field of knowledge should be
recognized as a temporary achievement. The colloquial expression for this
is IIl earn ing is a lifelong process ll • Selectivism implies a dynamic nature
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of knowledge which in turn implies that excellent teachers be lifelong
learners.
Selectivism and the Provision of Evidence for Excellence in Knowledge Claims
Selectivism is a method for seeking evidence for the existence of
excellence in knowledge claims. Essentially the criteria of excellence
in knowledge claims are described in selectivism as the natural concomitants
of the consequent actions of the selective dynamics of purposive behaviour.
For example, according to selectivism the development of ethical judgements
existing in human society arise from selective systems or natural norms
adjusting to social pressures by sanctioning and selecting human choices
and decisions. l Selectivism describes and accounts for the development
and origins of that knowledge which is termed ethics.
Truth, beauty and value are also criteria of excellence in knowledge,
and their derivation and development are explained by the process of
selectivism. Selectivism offers a theory of truth based on a method
of verification. It does this by describing the dynamic role of perception
in cognition. An individual interacting with his or her environment
possesses certain anticipations or apprehensions with respect to obtaining
or avoiding a certain goal object.
Recall the earlier example in this thesis of the individual leaving
a room in search of water to satisfy thirst. That individual has certain
perceptions about the location of water which he or she proceeded to
test out in the environment. To the extent that each anticipation brought
the individual closer to water and finally to its attainment, the trials
may be verified as true for that instance of interaction between indiviudal
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and environment and may be somewhat applicable to other similar
situations. Perceptual cognition in selectivism allows an individual
to verify what things situated in the environment will assist him or her
in the attainment or aversion of certain goals. Other criteria of
excellence in knowledge include claims about what is beautiful in the
world and what feelings should be valued in the world. Selectivism is
also a method for explaining the derivation and development of both
aesthetics and value theory. The term value is used here to connote
whatever is conceived as IIpositivell or IInegativell. Aesthetic values are
the values associated with selectivism which contribute most to the
contextualistic characteristics of selectivism. This is because aesthetic
values are qualitative by nature and must be Il'felt ll -to,bec:-I<newn, while ethical
values and cogntive values of truth or falsity are largely known by the
process of human reasoning.
The source or derivation of aesthetic value in selective systems is
found in the consummatory phases of goal seek'ing purposive behaviour. It
is in the consummatory phase that something may be enjoyed for its own
sake. Recall, in the discussion in Chapter III, the thirsty individual
who after obtaining water and quenching his or her immediate thirst consumes
the remaining water leisurely, savoring the taste and coolness of it.
Pepper,commenting on positive aesthetic value in the consummatory act,
states:
in consummatory acts and gratuitous satisfactions the organism
releases its tension in the longest2and fullest appreciationof the quality of the experience •••
Positive aesthetic value is described as satisfaction in felt quality; in
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selective systems the natural norm is to increase the satisfaction in
felt quality to the maximum. 3 An experience is aesthetically good if it
provides an intense feeling of satisfaction or pleasure for an extended
period of time.
Evidence for the existence and derivation of the values of lI,go(}d Jl or
Iibad lL is also explained by the dynamics of selectivism. The social
adjustment theory proposed by Pepper most clearly exemplifies this. A
value of II gaodl,l, may be applied to any act which results in a harmonious
balance between drives or a release of tensions between different drives
in interacting selective systems. The survival of a culture is deemed to
be good. This survival may arise out of people and institutions conforming
to a particular cultural pattern because of high social pressure. Thus
conformity, if it ensures survival, is valued as II goodll • Values of II goodll
and IIbad ll arise in selectivism when a selective system adjusts or fails to
adjust to the environment.
In the provision of evidence, selectivism offers a process or method
for explaining the derivation and development of those criteria of
knowledge which are deemed to be educationally excellent. Selectivism
describes the origins of the truth of an experience, the aesthetic value
of an experience, and the ethical or moral value of an experience as the
natural concomitants of knowledge events arising out of the dynamics of
selective systems. In a further contribution to a conceptual framework
for enriching our understanding of educational excellence, selectivism
also offers us knowledge ~bout the nature of knowledge. Let1s examine
this contribution in the following paragraphs~
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Selectivism and the Nature of Knowledge
Recall that earlier in this. thesis, knowledge and knowledge claims
were found to enrich meaning for an individual intellectually and
emotionally. In other words a person may acquire meaning by both thinking
and feeling. Selectivism proposes a definition of the nature of knowledge
as a synthetic and inherently complementary duality of what Pepper terms
the qualitative and the conceptual modes of cognition. By this ~e means
that knowledge possesses claims which may be felt to be known and
meaningful or may be thought or reasoned about in order to be meaningful.
For example an art object may .elicit a reasoned analysis from an observer
as to the artistic merit of the object, but additionally an observer has
qualitative feelings which give meaning to his or her experience of the
art object, i.e. the individual may feel pleasure or displeasure on viewing
the art. Thus, meaningful knowledge of the art object is obtained by the
processes of both thinking and feeling.
Selectivism asserts that events in the world are most comprehensively
interpreted from both the qualitative and conceptual modes of cognition.
In this assertion, selectivism provides knowledge about the nature of
knowledge claims and about the ways to best acquire full meaning from
these claims. Pepper feels that both the qualitative and conceptual modes
of cognition must be developed if an adequate comprehension of the world
is to be attained; an education which does not equally develop these two
modes is unbalanced. 4
If the tenets of selectivism are accepted and knowledge claims are
perceived to be by nature synthetic complements of intellectual and emotional
meanings then our current educational practices must be revised. Knowledge
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claims are currently taught dispersively in isolated disciplines and
educators imbue the claims and disciplines with meanings which are
obtained primarily by applying only one mode of cognition. For example,
students are taught to extract qualitative feelings from their
experiences of art. Conversely students are taught to experience knowledge
which is classified as scientific in an empirical, analytical way.
Selectivism overcomes the dualism between reason and feeling between
the sciences and the arts, by asserting that meaningful knowledge can be
both thought about and emotionally felt.
Educators engrossed in only one of the two modes of cognition will
be less disparag ing of one another and"; each other·s teach i ng' methods if they
come to believe what selectivism proposes - that knowledge is inherently
both qualitative and conceptual and that any item of knowledge may be
interpreted from both perspectives. If educators accept this tenet
offe~d' by selectivism and if in their capacity as educators they
perceive themselves as the refiners and disseminators of knowledge, then
the current conflicts and unequal status which exist between the arts and
the sciences should be eradicated~ It is in this context of promoting
harmony between the cognitive disciplines by presenting knowledge about the
structure of knowledge that selectivism, as a metaphilosophy, makes its
major contributions to the educational sphere and the pursuit of excellence.
Educational excellence, under the auspices of selectivisrn, judges knowledge
to be excellent if it provides an individual with an interpretation of the
truth, the aesthetically and the ethically valuable in life; but additionally
such excellence must be known both qualitatively and conceptually for an
individual to experience the fullest comprehension and enrichment of
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meaning possible. On this point, Pepper states ••• IIconcept and quality
are essential to each other in the understanding of our world. 1I5
The qualitative/conceptual nature of knowledge proposed by
selectivism implies that a theory of educating should seek to cultivate
an understanding and appreciation of life from bath-of these complementary
perspectives. Selectivism makes an appeal to education to contribute
to the development of an individual1s comprehension of the world by
encouraging and teaching the person to employ both qualitative and
conceptual modes of cognition. On the intrinsic and complementary
qualitativ€rconceptLta.l nature of knowledge Pepper offers an insightful
rebuttal to what he perceives as an overemphasis on the natural sciences
inth~educational system:
••• this same pressure almost stagnated history~ Only
scientific history seemed respectable. ,Yet history without
interpretation of the felt qualities of human interaction 6
and motivation is like a biography without a personality.
The synthetic principle of selectivism implies that both art and
science in education contribute equally important knowledge and values to
society and a theory of education should emphasize their mutual relevance.
Pepper comnlents:
••• and both contribute enormously to human knowledge: that of
art to the qualitative living experience of men, that of
science to the conceptual control of manJs environment. Human
wisdom requires that they should never be widely separated
from each other. Each needs the other fora balanced view of
the world] and for balanced judgement in human policy and
action ••.
Gowin, in his theory of educatin~ asserts the same concern as Pepper
for changing the meaning of human experiences by integrating the conceptual
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and qualitative aspects of experience through purposive behaviour. This
can be seen in the following comments:
••• But the best sense of educating should sustain a flourishing
integration of thinkfng, feeling and acting ••• These three
elements need each other. Thinking needs feeling in order to
operate; thought by itself moves nothing; feeling shorn of
thinking is without direction. Acting in an intentional way
validates both thinking and feeling ••• Actingtests ideas:
it arouses and expresses feeling~ Thinking leads to acting
because thinking helps us to see and comprehend alternatives.8
Gowins concept of testing ideas is similar to the anticipations and
apprehensions or trial acts of purposive behaviour as outlined in
selectivism. The validation of thinking and feeling by intentional
acting is a reiteration of the concept of the self~regulating mechanism
of selectivism assisting an individual to adapt to his or her environment
with the maximum cornpx'eJlertsion possible. Both selectivism and Gowin1s
theory of educating assert that human experiences of the world including
educational experiences involve a person in thinking, feeling and acting.
Summarizing briefly, this author feels that selectivism offers
individuals knowledge about the nature of knowledge as synthetic events
which evoke both human thinking and feeling. In selectivism knowledge
claims are conceived of and arise out of purposive human activity. In
the pursuit of educational excellence, tile relevancy of both thinking and
feeling should be taught by teachers, grasped by learners, i'nherent in
curriculum materials and be exemplified in the policies of those responsible
for the governance of educative events. Selectivism also contributes to
a conceptual framework for understanding educational excellence by
explicating and providing knowledge about the way people acquire meaning.
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Selectivism as a Method for Acquiring Meaning
Attempts to seek meaning in human experiences of the world involves
individuals in constructing reality in terms of their own world view.
The act of interpreting the world from some common sense analogy is
purposive human behaviour. The goal of this behaviour is to attain the
most meaning of an event possible for a particular individual. Persons
who become aware of the way in which they personally perceive the world
gain an insight into how they as individuals learn and construct
knowledge. Additionally, individuals can gain insight into how others
construct knowledge and find meaning in events.
This is vital information for a teacher. If a teacher is aware of
a student's perceptual framework then the teacher has an opportunity to
present new knowledge to the student in terms of that student1s world
view. Knowledge claims are learned more readily and are more meaningful
the more consonant they are to a student1s actual world view. It is also
important in learning to know the variety of adequate ways that people
use to construct meaning, because one then gains insight into other ways
of perceiving and organizing data. Thus, one's ability to interpret
evidence in the world becomes expanded.
Selectivism in this author's opinion explains the derivation and use of
interpretive analogies as purposive behaviour that humans engage in to lend
meaning to human experiences of the world. Selectivism is a metahypothesis
that describes world hypotheses as different methods that humans use to
construct meaning and give purposeto their lives. In this capacity selectivism
contributes to educational excellence by providing insight into the nature of
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the human construction of meaning. This insight is vital for teachers who
need to accorrmodate studentlsper~eptuarframework£ if LearnJng' tsto occur.
It is equally vital for students to gain insight into other ways of
learning and making life events meaningful.
SUMMARY
In summary, this author feels that selectivism expands and enriches
the basic tenets of Western society that relate to a theory of educating.
It enriches the concept of the provision, maintenance and evolution of
knowledge for use by future generations by providing a basis for
educational excellence. Selectivism as a basis for eductional excellence
offers two major insights for our consideration. First, selectivism
provides a theory about the nature and structure of knowledge. In this
dual capacity selectivism can (1) assist teachers and administrators in
the provision of knowledge claims which are meaningful and enriching;
(2) can assist educators in the provision of evidence about the
meaningfulness and excellence of knowledge claims; (3) can assist students
and teachers to acquire knowledge about the qualitative/conceptual nature
of knowledge; (4) can provide a basis for revisioning excellent
curriculum materials as knowledge which must be acquired by thtnking,
feeling and acting on their meaning; and (5) can assist individuals to
broaden their capacities to acquire meaning from life events, by
demonstrating the variety of other ways in which they may construct
knowledge.
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Furthermore selectivism offers a method for healing the schism
between the sciences and the arts; between those educators who feel
that meaning is best grasped by reasoning and those who feel that mean.ing
is best grasped by feeling. Humans are intellectual and emotional beings
and take meaning from the world by thinking, feeling and acting.
Selectivism asserts that meaningful knowledge can only be gained via the
human experiences of the world. Thus knowledge is best gained through
both thinking and feeling because these are inherent components of the
human psyche. Selectivism asserts that art and science are mutually
relevant; that educating to be excellent must consider the lived
experience of individuals to be laden with both intellectual and felt
qualities.
Thus, for education to be considered excellent it should attempt to
develop an individual1s emotional and intellectual capacities to the
fullest. Selectivism presents educational theory with knowledge about the
nature of human knowledge that demands that the IIqualitatively felt ll and
lIintellectual ll experiences of life not be separated from one another in
the educative process. To do so is to deny aspects of meaning for an
individual. Figure XI is a schematic representing the concepts discussed
in this chapter in discovering the contributions of selectivism as a
basis for educational excellence.
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CHAPTER VI
SELECTIVISM AND CULTURAL SURVIVAL
INTRODUCTION
In the creation and refinement of meaning, an individual today is
assisted by a richness and expansiveness of knowledge which is almost beyond
imagination. Unfortunately this vast array of knowledge is still primarily
experienced in a fragmentary way. Largely this is because most knowledge
is specialized or set apart in autonomous disciplines. Such isolating of
knowledge into separate cognitive disciplines was a sufficent means of
ensuring an adequate education for individuals living in an age of
specialization. In the age of specialization the observed universe was
seen from the lenses of particular disciplines each describing the world from
isolated vantage points. Currently the amount of knowledge available is
so vast that for a more adequate comprehension of the world the specialist
approach needs the complement of a generalistls approach.
From the generalist1s point of view, meaning is enriched by experiencing
knowledge not in a fragmentary fashion, by adhering to the method of one
cognitive discipline, but rather by adopting a synthetic viewpoint that
stresses the innate interrelatedness of our knowledge of the world.
Specialized knowledge disseminated through educational systems is not
providing a coherent view of the world. This is a serious threat to the
survival of cultures which are already technologically immersed in more
global outlooks. Current technological developments are emphasizing
information processing on a vast scale. In doing so technology is
connecting and collectively interrelating knowledge claims from many
different fields. However in this author1s opinion a global ethic is
required to match the technologies being employed. People are still
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thinking in specialized ways and are out of touch or overwhelmed by the
shift to a global world view. Essentially the current organizational
framework of knowledge on which the educational system in Western society
is based is outmoded.
The drive towards a generalist global reality of civilization will soon
demand a new perspective of knowledge. Indeed it is this author1s opinion
that such ademand has existed for some time. If the survival of the human
species is truly dependent on the development of a global society~ (and
this appears to be the current reality) then future generations~require a
synthetic comprehensive system of knowledge. Such a synthetic method must
reorganize and adapt the current knowledge structure.
SELECTIVISM - A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR EDUCATORS
Providing a conceptual basis for adapting the current knowledge
structure is, in this author1s opinion, the primary contribution of the
metaphilosophy of selectivism to a theory of educating. This thesis has
shown that selectivism accomplishes this by first, providing a method of
interpreting knowledge which is applicable to a wide range of phenomena
encountered in our experiencing of the world. Selectivism shares the
identity of an interpretive hypothesis with the other world hypotheses
of formism, mechanism, contextual ism, and organicism. Second, selectivism
provides an epistemology for use by educators. This espistemology reflects
the intrinsic synthetic nature of knowledge and the ability of selectivism
to interpret the world from a synthetic vantage point.
It is an epistemology which reorganizes the framework of knowledge.
Theories of truth, ethical, moral and aesthetic values; all criteria of
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educational excellence possess a synthetic qualitative/conceputal identity
in selectivism. According to selectivism the evidence for the excellence
of knowledge claims is synthetic by nature and should be pursued and
sought using a synthetic method. Criteria of excellence should be
emotionally and intellectually experienced.
The failure of the current framework of knowledge to provide a global
or synthetic perspective for making meaning out of the world is emphasized
by Peter Drucker in The Age of Discontinuity •
••• The most probable assumption is that every single one of
the old demarcations, disciplines, and faculties is going to
become obsolete and a barrier to learning as well as to
understanding. The fact that we are shifing. from a Cartesian
view of the universe, in which the accent has been on parts
and elements, to a configuration view~ with the emphasis on
wholes and patterns, challengeslevery single dividing line between
areas of study and knowledge •••
Selectivism challenges the divisions between the cognitive disciplines of
the sciences and the arts. It appeals to a framework of knowledge which
harmonizes these disciplines in a concept which defines knowledge as something
which cannot fully be understood unless it is experienced through felt
qualities and reasoning activities.
Education which fails to provide evidence for all knowledge claims or
fails to teach knowledge claims in terms of both of these experiential modes
is negligent according to the conceptual framework provided by selectivism.
In a wholistic or global world a framework of knowledge must have scope, be
able to synthesize knowledge claims, define their nature and, additionally,
descrlbe the nature and interrelatedness of all knowledge. Knowledge must
move from its emphasis on specialization to a synthetic emphasis to be
useful to generations living in a global age. In a wholistic environment an
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individual1s meaning of the world will not be enriched by experiencing
specalized areas of knowledge unless these areas are presented in a
synthetic fashion which demonstrates their interrelatedness and inter-
connectedness.
The current revolution ,in information processing is demonstrative of
technological attempts to adapt to the vast array of knowledge available
from a global perspective. Such technology will prove futile,however,
unless a global, wholistic ethic or perspective is introduced into
educational theory. Curricula cannot continue to present and interpret
knowledge claims in only one experiential mode, for this denies the full
nature of knowledge. i.e. both science and art should be taught in a
fashion which expresses the emotional and intellectual aspects of each. In
addition curricula must begin to provide an integrated approach to knowledge
and the lines which segregate disciplines into isolated cognitive
specialities must dissolve. To an extent the biological sciences have
attempted this in their presentation of knowledge about ecological systems
and communities. The sociological sciences have also contributed to a sense
of wholistic, communal knowledge in presenting claims about the n.ature of
man and society. However, irl these instances the task has only just begtiln~
A greater number of educators must adopt a generalist ethic in respect
to their philosophical understanding of knowledge and the functions of
knowledge and begin to apply it to the design of curricula if the students
in their care are to become cognizant of a global perspective. The challenge
at this time is to adapt the current foundations of knowledge to a wholistic
global reality.
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Thus far, this chapter has discussed selectivism as a metaphilosophy
which this author believes provides a much needed and restructured conceptual
framework of knowledge. Such a framework provides educators with a theory
about the structure of knowledge which stresses the synthetic nature of
conceptualizing experiences. Recall from the discussion in Chapter IV that
selectivism asio synthesizes other world perspectives into its structure -
the characteristics of organicism, contextual ism and mechanism are clearly
visible - and in so doing offers additional scope for interpreting the
knowledge of the world.
In providing a new conceptual basis for adapting the current foundations
of knowledge, selectivism bridges the distances between the specialized
cognitive disciplines. In so doing selectivism offers a practical method
for the implementation of its ideology. This method involves:the
encouragement of mutuality between individuals.
In selectivism the concept of mutuality is not a mere "brotherhood
statement U , but a functional requisite for maintaining a balanced culture
in which maximum satisfaction for the individual and for society is sought.
Such mutuality is sought in the governance of the social adjustment theory
in Pepperls metaphilosophyand will need to besought in the revisioning
of educational theory and practise. Understanding the concept of mutuality
between people is the key to acceptance of a new framework of knowledge for
cultural survival and to the acceptance of' a':global and panoramic world view.
Sonle might comment that to' cons ider concepts of mutua I ity, of ho list ic
world views, and a nevi epistemology. in the 'attainment of a global
perspective is merely dabbling in utopian ideals. This author feels,
however, that the time has long paSSed when the:se co'ncepts should be
considered utopian ideals. The evidence of destruction caused by a lack
of a global perspective is too great to deny the reality and need of what
Laszlo eloquently terms a I'new ageethos ll • 2 Empirical experience of the
current imbalance between the human race and the natural environment should
be enough to convince the most callous cynic of the need for a new perspective
- a perspective based on synthetic, wholistic foundations. The connection
between the synthetic appeal of the principles of the metaphilosophy of
selectivism and the need for new foundations of knowledge to encourage a
sense of mutuality and'the interdependence of all living things becomes
self-evident. Selectivism appears to be a metaphilosophy II made to measure ll
for meeting these needs.
There are also those who would label an attempt to change the
conceptual foundations of knowledge as anarchy. This would be true if the
result is permanent disorder or confusion; however, if the result is a much
need reform, such an attempt becomes a matter of mobilizing adaptation and
radical change. Changing the conceptual foundations of knowledge involves
uncovering and identifying existing patterns of mutuality between adherents
of disparate knowledge fields and reinforcing these patterns ~s building
blocks for the future.
To the extent that our knowledge of ethical values arises Qut of the
dynamics of selectivism it is not surprising that the concept of mutuality
is so evident in selectivisms· theory of social a~justment. The connection
between mutuality and ethics in bringing about change, has been addressed
by previous philosophers. Peter ~ropotkin a Russian philosopher who
lived during the time of the Bolshevik Revolution~ ptofessed that ethics be
founded on a principle of mutual aid which he felt was self-evident in
evolutionary theory.3
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In KropotkinJs writing, there is startling resemblance to both
Pepper's and Laszlo·s appeal for harmony, interrelatedness, and mutual
dependancy if a balanced society so necessary for cultural survival is
to be achieved. Kropotkin comments:
••• That mutual aid is the real foundation of our ethical
conceptions seems evident enough~ But whatever the opinions
as to the first origin of the mutual aid feeling or instinct
may be - whether a biological or super-natural cause is
ascribed to it - we must trace its existence as far back as
to the lowest stages of animal life where "'Ie can fo11ow its
uninterrupted evolution, in opposition to a number of~contrary
agencies, throijgh all degrees of human development, up to the
present times.
Perhaps it is selectivism and systems philosophy which describe the origins
of the concept of mutual aid Kropotkin advocated. Kropotkin does not
profess an ideology which results in a perfect harmonious society but
rattler one in ~vhich the ethics derived from mutual aid bring about the
maximum balance achievable.
The social adjustment theory of selectivism and the epistemology
contained within this metaphilosophy also appear idealistic in theme.
Perhaps it was for this reason that Pepper devoted so much time to
empirically developing the root metaphor', ofselectivisnl b'ased on purposive
behaviour. For the root metaphor of' purposive behaviour is based on
tile realities of means 'and ends; it is an ideal based on enlpirical
evidence~ Perhaps this was PepperLs way of making a'metaphilosophy so
aligned with ethics, aesthetics, and value theory~ palatable to the
empirical scientists. Perhaps' the quintessential eleme'nt of'selectivism
as it relates to knowledge and educatiunal excellence is its portrayal
of the union of idealism and empiricism. Idealism is conceiving laden
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with qualitatively felt values. Empiricism is conceiving based on logic
and reason. In selectivism these two methods of conceptualizing are
portrayed as necessary complements of human constructions of meaning.
Thus far, this chapter has summarily commented on the need for the
conceptual relations which exist between metaphilosophy, particularly
selectivism and educating~ Speculation must also be invited on additional
possibilities arising out of a new framework of knowledge based on the
metaph i losophy-of !.)e 1ect ivism. Througho'ut th is thes i s areas were opened
up for further exploration and numerous telling questions were derived.
Let us examine some of those now.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE INQUIRIES
Several general areas arose in this thesis which in this authorls
opinion require more extensive consideration. Of prime importance are
the areas concerned with: (1) incorporating and identifying world
hypotheses in curriculum materials to assist students in discovering new
ways to learn, (2) identifying selectivism as a fifth adequate world
hypothesis or a synthetic metaphypothesis whi~h is the analogy or root
metaphor of Pepper1s root metaphor theory, ~nd (3) further comparing the
concepts and functions of systems philosophy and selectivism to discover
if one more adequately accounts for the evidence of the nature of the
world than the other.
World Hypotheses and Curricula
Further explorations are requried to provide practical methods by
which the world perspectives of formism, mechanism, contextual ism, organicism
and selectivism can be incorporated into curricula which are structured
for use in educating in order to enrich individuals· comprehension of
the world. There is much more to be accomplished in identifying meta-
philosophy in the current curricula and in heightening students and
teachers awareness of the' nature of such knowledge. The benefits and
need for doing this should be examined further.
A practical pedagogy must be developed which exemplifies the
qualitative/conceptual reality of knowledge claims and provides evidence
for this reality in accepted criteria of excellence. Further researth
is required to locate a method to ensure a smooth transition from
curricula which contain specialized knowledge claims to curricula which
present the interconnectedness of knowledge claims as they relate to
other knowledge claims. How will the content of curricula move from
being autonomous specialized knowledge to being synthetic knowledge
applicable to a wide range of phenomena? The perspectives of teachers,
curriculum designers, administrators and students must undergo a
radical transition. Such reform needs mobilization. A plan of action
is required to assist in the transition. A vast amount of research and
effort should be directed to this end.
The Nature and Identity of Selectivism
It is the contention of this thesis that selectivism is both an
interpretive world hypothesis which seeks to provide evidence for knowledge
claims and an epistemology which describes the nature and structure of
knowledge as both qualitative and conceptual. In addition it is a
process describing the origins of knowledge and of experiences and events
in the world as the consequent actions of purposive behaviour. A question
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needing further exploration is whether selectivism is in reality a
hypothesis for describing the origins of Pepper1s root metaphor theory?
This author feels that selectivism is the root metaphor of the root
metaphor theory. Selectivism perceives the acts of interpreting the
world from common sense analogies as purposive human behaviour. ~Jorld
hypotheses in selectivistic terms have their origins in human purposive
attempts to create meaning.
Also, additional effort should be directed to exemplifying in greater
detail both the synthetic nature of selectivism and its synthetic
principles. The applications of such a synthetic' world view to areas
outside of the field of education should be considered. Finally, the
concept of mutuality in th~ social adjustment theory needs greater
clarification and exploration as it relates to ethical principles and an
adjustable balanced society~
Systems Philosophy and Selectivism
Of paramount importance in comparing systems philosophy and
selectivism is the fact that systems philosophy expands the adequacy of
selectivism as a world hypothesis. It accomplishes this by placing a
less anthropomorphic emphasis on the root metaphor of self-regulatory
adaptive behaviour. Further questions need to be raised asking why
Pepper chose to concentrate on human systems as opposed to general systems?
The adequacy of the scope of selectivism as a world hypothesis must be
examined further because of this restriction. An analysis of Pepper1s
claim that there exists a qualitative as well as conceptual nature in
all things will provide the needed answer. It must be shown how all
entities - human and non human - possess an intrinsic qualitative/conceptual
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nature. Only then will selectivismtruly be a world hypothesis of
adequate scope.
A greater exploration of the organistic characteristics of both
selectivism and systems philosophy should also be initiated because
both philosophies appear to be functionally dependant on organistic
concepts. Selectivism proposes a theory of -social adjustment which is
functionally dependant on a concept of interrelatedness between individuals
and groups of individuals - essentially on a concept of' mutuality.
Systems philosophy is dependant on the functional interrelatedness between
inter and intrasystemic levels in the macro-microhierarchies~ The key
concept shared between the two is the interrelatedness of elements in the
respective systems; this is highly indicative of a strong organistic
influence. Are selectivism and systems philosophy really organic theories
derived to meet the demands of a dawning· wholisticand global perspective
of the structure of the world? A greater conceptual analysis of these
metaphilosophies should provide the ~nswer.
OVERALL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The general contention and conclusion of this thesi's has been that
the metaphilosophy of selectivism can provide a basis for educational
excellence and that it can do so by 'contributing a new conception about
the structure and nature of knowledge 'to the framework of educational
theory. This conclusion was generated by exploring the relationships
between meaning, metaphilosophy and educational excellence. The 'work of
Stephen C. Pepper and D. Bob Gowin provided the conceptual groundwork
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for investigation the fields of metaphilosophy and education
respectively. The world hypotheses of formism~ mechanism, contextual ism and
organi'cism" were explicated and their potential contributions to
teaching, learning, curriculum and governance were explored.
Most particularly, however, this thesis has examined and explicated
the metaphilosophy known as selectivism and identified ways in which its
synthetic principles revise our knowledge of educational excellence and
provide an epistemology for use by concerned educators. Finally this
thesis has presented a plea that educators be concerned with adopting
a new ethic regarding the synthetic nature of knowledge.
Knowledge constructions designed for educational purposes and based
on the tenets of selectivism, will reflect educators· acknowledgement of
the synthetic, holistic nature of the universe. The Cartesian view of
reality is shifting to a 'holistic world view. If future generations are
to continue to survive and find purpose and meaning in life they must
continue to be educated and enriched. Educators must give future
generations adequate and satisfying modes of beholding and communicating
shifting views of reality if human culture is to survive. It is in this
capacity that selectivism contributes to a synthetic, world view and
interpretation of reality~ Selectivism is a current aid for educators
concerned with cultural survival in human evolution.
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